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1 
Introduction 
 
The 1980s Sanctuary Movement and the Role of American Catholics 
 
 
 On the evening of May 4, 1981, Frank Shutts arrived at the modest home of Jim and 
Pat Corbett outside of Tucson, Arizona.  The Corbetts were Quakers who raised chickens and 
herded goats, and Shutts, a Quaker from Claremont, California, was traveling to Quaker 
meetings around the region trying to build support for the establishment of a new Friends’ 
center in Hermosillo, the capital of nearby Sonora, Mexico.  The trio expected one more 
visitor, a fellow Quaker named Jim Dudley, but when he arrived later in the evening he 
brought peculiar news with him.  Confused and shaken, he explained that on the way to 
Tucson, he had picked up a Salvadoran hitchhiker just north of the US-Mexico border, but 
Border Patrol had stopped Dudley at a checkpoint several miles up the road and removed and 
arrested the hitchhiker.  Corbett connected it back to the discovery during the previous 
summer of thirteen Salvadorans who had died attempting to cross the Sonora desert into the 
United States.  Corbett found the constellation of events curious enough that the next day he 
located the detained Salvadoran and traveled to the Santa Cruz County Jail to speak with 
him.  He was able to chat briefly with this hitchhiker and two other detained Salvadorans and 
attempted to present forms that would delay their deportation, but the jail delayed this 
process sufficiently long that they could send away all three men before Corbett could do 
anything about it.1 
 As Jim Corbett and others he worked with became more involved in aiding 
undocumented Central Americans, they would go on to realize that a steady stream of 
refugees from Guatemala and El Salvador was pouring into the United States as hundreds of 
                                                
1 Miriam Davidson, Convictions of the Heart: Jim Corbett and the Sanctuary Movement, Tucson 1988, 12-22. 
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thousands of individuals fled devastating civil wars between the conservative governments of 
these countries and domestic left-wing insurgencies.  The Reagan administration had become 
involved in these conflicts, funding and training soldiers and paramilitary groups for the 
right-wing governments of El Salvador and Guatemala and framing this aid as a fight against 
“Communist” rebels, as Washington saw the left-wing insurgencies in these countries.2  One 
consequence of viewing these conflicts as Cold War battlegrounds was the administration’s 
almost categorical refusal to grant asylum to Guatemalan and Salvadoran refugees.  Granting 
them asylum would have been an implicit admission that their governments endangered their 
rights and physical safety, and Washington was unwilling to betray its allies by labeling them 
as human rights violators. 
 Corbett and a small, religious-based group of compatriots in Tucson found this state 
of affairs unacceptable.  To aid the refugees and protest the administration’s immigrant 
policy and foreign policy, the Tucson group constructed a grassroots network of churches 
and synagogues that came to span the country and quickly became known as the sanctuary 
movement.  Drawing on the centuries-old practice of religious sanctuary, sanctuary activists 
helped to aid and shelter refugees and protect them from deportation.  They hoped that by 
aiding the refugees in a highly visible way and drawing attention to their plight they might be 
able to pressure Washington to reform its refugee policy and perhaps even to reconsider its 
alliances with the Guatemalan and Salvadoran governments.3  And while Quakers like Jim 
Corbett helped to kick off the movement, sanctuary work was highly ecumenical.  Other 
Protestants and Jews joined the movement, and Catholics were consistently one of the best-
                                                
2 Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism, 
New York 2006, 70-72, 87-89. 
3 “The State, the Law, and the Sanctuary Movement,” essay by Jim Corbett, May 8, 1985; Wisconsin Historical 
Society (WHS), Records of the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America (CRTFCA) 1982-1992, 
M2004-170, Box 2, Folder 5. 
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represented denominations, with priests, nuns, and laity across the country offering up their 
communities as sanctuaries. 
Though the sanctuary movement has been characterized by one scholar as “one of the 
most important acts of civil disobedience of the late twentieth century,”4 surprisingly few 
researchers have devoted much attention to it.  One of the most important works on the U.S. 
Central American peace movement more generally is Christian Smith’s Resisting Reagan, 
published in 1996, and in his introduction he expresses amazement that “the U.S. Central 
American peace movement of the 1980s has received scant attention in both the popular and 
academic literature.”  “Indeed,” he adds, “many scholars appear unaware that it ever 
existed.”5 This latter claim is something of an exaggeration—notably, Susan Bibler Coutin 
published her excellent anthropological study of the sanctuary movement in 1993—but 
Smith correctly identifies the lack of attention given to sanctuary and related peace 
movements.6  Smith’s work is a thorough and rigorous sociological study of the U.S. Central 
America peace movement, but in the sixteen years since its publication, scholars have done 
little more significant work on the sanctuary movement.  María Cristina García, for instance, 
offers one of the better analyses of the movement in her Seeking Refuge, but this treatment 
spans only ten pages in a book on Central American refugees in the 1980s in general.7  Anne 
Crittenden’s Sanctuary provides perhaps the best general narrative of the movement’s 
development, but its tight focus on and partiality to the Tucson-centered elements of the 
movement forces her to leave out much of the story of sanctuary.8  Most scholars who 
                                                
4 María Cristina García, Seeking Refuge: Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and 
Canada, Berkeley 2006, 98. 
5 Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The U.S. Central America Peace Movement, Chicago 1996, xvii. 
6 Susan Bibler Coutin, The Culture of Protest: Religious Activism and the U.S. Sanctuary Movement, Boulder 
1993. 
7 García, Seeking Refuge, 98-108. 
8 Anne Crittenden, Sanctuary: A Story of American Conscience and the Law in Collision, New York 1988. 
4  
mention the movement at all do so in passing and often without even using the term 
“sanctuary.” 
 The sanctuary movement was a broad-based, ecumenical endeavor, encompassing 
many Christian denominations as well as many Jewish communities.  This unity of purpose, 
however, can sometimes obscure important differences among and within the groups 
participating.  Every religious community approached sanctuary work with a different set of 
historical experiences and attitudes shaping their understanding of their activism and the 
significance and repercussions of that activism within the community.  Jews and Christians, 
for instance, often had different motivations for becoming involved in sanctuary, and they 
often justified and interpreted their actions in different ways.  Differences existed between 
Christian denominations as well.  Most evangelical and fundamentalist Christians did not 
participate at all. 
American Catholics in particular had a special connection to the Central American 
conflicts and to the refugee crisis. Virtually all Central American refugees were themselves 
Catholic, and Catholic leaders in Guatemala and El Salvador were often explicit targets of 
violence.9  Most famously, the Salvadoran military junta assassinated Oscar Romero, the 
Archbishop of San Salvador, in early 1980 for criticizing the regime and calling for peace.10  
The US Catholic hierarchy was not silent on the matter: many bishops did support granting 
refugees “extended voluntary departure,” essentially a deferral of deportation without 
officially granting asylum. But the bishops seemed reluctant to actually endorse sanctuary, 
when many other national religious bodies openly advocated it.  Just over a year after the 
inauguration of the sanctuary movement, it had received endorsements from the governing 
                                                
9 García, Seeking Refuge, 29 
10 Davidson, Convictions of the Heart, 17. 
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bodies of a variety of mainline Christian denominations, including the Presbyterian Church 
USA, the United Methodist Church, and the United Church of Christ.11  The American 
Catholic hierarchy, on the other hand, made surprisingly few statements on the movement 
throughout the 1980s.  While individual bishops often took stronger stances, the hierarchy as 
a group avoided explicitly endorsing or rejecting sanctuary by making clear their inability or 
unwillingness to support it.  The American hierarchy was one of the only major American 
religious bodies outside evangelicals and fundamentalists to display such caution. 
Other American Catholics did not necessarily follow this lead.  Lay Catholics as well 
as priests and religious12 participated in the movement at least as enthusiastically as Jews and 
other Christians.  Near the peak of national participation in August 1988, of an estimated 464 
sanctuaries around the country, 78 were Catholic communities—the largest number provided 
by any single denomination.13  A handful of bishops even endorsed and supported the 
movement throughout the decade.  But sanctuary activists and supporters also faced strong 
opposition from other Catholics, from lay organizations to other bishops.  Catholics were 
divided, often bitterly so, over the appropriate response to the sanctuary movement. 
This division was not unique to Catholics—disagreements over the movement beset 
virtually every religious community involved in sanctuary work—but it took on a special 
significance in the context of American Catholic history.  The American church had for most 
of its history been overwhelmingly cautious and parochial in its approach to politics.  Until 
the 20th century, most American Catholics were immigrant or “ethnic” minority families, and 
                                                
11 Detroit Sanctuary Project Mailing, August 16, 1983; Bentley Historical Library, Episcopal Church, Diocese 
of Michigan Records, 1830-2001, Box 17, Folder: Latin American Refugee Issues and Peace Movement 1983-
85. 
12 When used as a noun, the term “religious” refers to monks, nuns, and other members of “religious institutes” 
who have taken vows and committed themselves to communal lives of poverty, celibacy, and often of charity or 
service. 
13 Chart listing denominational and geographical breakdown of sanctuaries in August 1988; WHS, Records of 
the CRTFCA 1982-1992, M93-153, Box 4, Folder 66. 
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bishops devoted their political work to helping the Catholics in their dioceses and defending 
American Catholics against doubts regarding their “Americanness.”14  But thanks to 
demographic changes in the middle of the 20th century and the liberalizing reforms of the 
Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), American Catholics at all levels of the church began to 
explore new understandings of their faith and new ways to express it politically.  In a variety 
of domains, from the Vietnam War era to electoral politics of the 1970s and 1980s, Catholics 
experimented with new formulations of their religious and political identities. 
One such identity, modest in its origins, was that of the Catholic Left of the 1960s and 
1970s.  Building on the thought and work of other radical Catholics like Dorothy Day and 
Thomas Merton, this loose coalition of anti-Vietnam War protestors expressed their 
opposition to the conflict largely by breaking into Selective Service offices and burning draft 
documentation.15  The movement was small, though, its core never comprising more than 
about two hundred people, and though movement leaders like Daniel and Philip Berrigan 
went on to lead more progressive activism in the 1970s and 1980s, the movement largely 
faded with the antiwar movement itself.16  Nonetheless, I intend to argue that the Catholic 
Left not only survived the Vietnam era but also reached its peak and found its fullest 
expression in the 1980s with Catholic participation in the sanctuary movement.  Like 
partisans of the Catholic Left over a decade earlier, Catholic sanctuary activists were willing 
to defy federal and episcopal authority by opposing wars they found to be both unjust and the 
source of vast human suffering.  The defining mark of the Catholic Left was just this 
                                                
14 Timothy Byrnes, Catholic Bishops in American Politics, Princeton 1991, 11-34. 
15 For one good account of the Catholic Left, see Charles A. Meconis, With Clumsy Grace: The American 
Catholic Left 1961-1975, New York 1979. 
16 Meconis, With Clumsy Grace, xi.  For a biography of the Berrigan brothers, see Murray Polner and Jim 
O’Grady, Disarmed and Dangerous: The Radical Lives and Times of Daniel and Philip Berrigan, New York 
1997. 
7  
willingness to dissent or even to break the law in order to protest what they saw as unjustified 
US militarism, to prompt church and state to live up to their governing principles without 
feeling that through this dissent they had betrayed either institution.  Dissent was in fact a 
sign of their fidelity to both, their way of fully living up to both the Catholic and American 
aspects of their identities.  By the 1980s, this sensibility, previously expressed only by a tiny 
fraction of American Catholics, had percolated more deeply into the church, and now 
hundreds of thousands of American Catholics, including a handful of bishops, were willing 
to voice their support for the sanctuary and even to participate in it.  And while Catholic 
sanctuary work was primarily an antiwar endeavor, it also served as a vector for promoting 
other issues, such as a feminist critique of the exclusively male church hierarchy. 
 Structurally, this thesis will proceed thematically and roughly chronologically.  In the 
first chapter, I will examine the broader context of the sanctuary movement.  I will describe 
the conflicts in Guatemala and El Salvador and the United States’ relationship to them and 
sketch American Christian and Jewish responses to the influx of refugees from this region 
and to the sanctuary movement in particular.  The second chapter will examine Catholics 
who supported or participated in the sanctuary movement, exploring how the work of these 
priests, religious, and lay Catholics represented a fulfillment of the Catholic Left of the 1960s 
and 1970s but also drew on deeper radical and progressive roots in American Catholic 
history.  In the final chapter, I will investigate the American Catholic hierarchy’s response to 
sanctuary, demonstrating the Catholic Left’s influence on the hierarchy as several bishops 
chose to endorse the sanctuary movement.  Responding to these radical colleagues, more 
moderate bishops defined their positions on sanctuary—and Catholic political engagement 
8  
more generally—with greater depth and nuance, and they adopted stances more favorable to 
sanctuary than might otherwise have been expected. 
9 
I 
 
Challenging Reagan 
 
Central America, Ronald Reagan, and the Roots of the US Sanctuary Movement 
 
 
 On March 24, 1982, Jim Corbett, the Rev. John Fife, and a handful of other members 
of a small group known as the Tucson Ecumenical Council (TEC) gathered outside Tucson’s 
Southside Presbyterian Church to declare it the nation’s first public sanctuary1982.  This 
designation indicated that Southside would explicitly defy immigration law by offering food, 
shelter, and protection to undocumented refugees, and in a very visible way—every public 
sanctuary contacted Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) to inform them of their 
decision and often made the declaration into a media event.  Southside had taken in a 
Salvadoran refugee who went by the pseudonym “Alfredo,” and local reporters stood by as 
he told the story of his persecution in El Salvador and flight to the United States.1 The 
Southside sanctuary for Central American refugees was the first of its kind, but within just a 
few years the sanctuary movement had become a national sensation.  By the end of 1982, 
Corbett’s activism had found favorable reception in reporting by national papers like the 
Washington Post and the Chicago Tribune, and in December the television news show 60 
Minutes ran a sympathetic special on Corbett and the sanctuary movement.2  By August 
1988, the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America estimated that the movement 
included 464 public sanctuaries, some protecting individual refugees and others taking in 
                                                
1 Ann Crittenden, Sanctuary: A Story of American Conscience and the Law in Collision, New York 1988, 69-
73. 
2 Ibid., 102-104. 
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entire families.3  And this figure did not include the many religious communities that 
supported the movement in quieter, more unofficial ways.  The sanctuary movement 
appeared to surge into existence out of nothing, but the forces that brought it about were at 
work years, decades, and even centuries before this moment.  The U.S. sanctuary movement 
was a complex phenomenon born of the convergence of various currents in religious history 
and in the history of the Americas.  In order to understand why the movement came about 
when and in the manner that it did, it is important to assess the ways these various historical 
forces interacted to produce it. 
 We can understand the emergence of the sanctuary movement from two primary 
perspectives, the first of which involves examining the external, political factors that 
produced a Central American refugee crisis in the first place.  Despite its influence in the 
region, the United States did not directly cause the civil wars in Central America; these 
conflicts emerged from centuries-old political and economic tensions.4  However, American 
foreign policy had left a deep footprint in Central America since the inception of the United 
States, and US involvement in the region took a particularly deadly turn in the 1980s as the 
Reagan administration turned US Central America policy into another weapon of the Cold 
War.5  Fighting Central American “Communists” (a problematic label that did not accurately 
describe most of the left-wing insurgents) became the centerpiece of Reagan’s Cold War 
foreign policy, but this choice placed Washington in a curious situation. The aid it provided 
to right-wing regimes and paramilitaries exacerbated levels of violence and augmented the 
                                                
3 Chart listing denominational and geographical breakdown of sanctuaries in August 1988; Wisconsin Historical 
Society (WHS), Records of the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America (CRTFCA), 1982-1992, 
M93-153, Box 4, Folder 66. 
4 Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The U.S. Central America Peace Movement, Chicago 1996, 5-16. 
5 Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism, 
New York 2006, 2-4. 
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number of refugees both fleeing the region and seeking asylum in the United States.  These 
refugees brought with them stories of atrocities and personal tragedy brought about by state-
sponsored violence, which contradicted the White House’s official narrative of supporting 
righteous conservative governments against Communist radicals.6  These stories indicted 
Washington’s choice to insert itself into the Central American conflicts, and religious 
communities in the Southwestern United States were among the first to take notice. 
 The other important perspective from which to understand the emergence of the 
sanctuary movement—more “internal” in a sense—concerns factors in the history of US 
religion and social movements that made the American religious community receptive to the 
challenge of sanctuary.  In the broadest sense, the practice of sanctuary had roots stretching 
back to the Middle Ages, but sanctuary activists also connected their work to the 
Underground Railroad of the 19th century United States.7  There were also more proximate 
causes of the US religious community’s response to the Central American refugee crisis.  A 
small but significant number of mainline religious leaders participated in the Vietnam 
antiwar movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and in the second half of the 1970s 
many churches served as official sponsors of Indochinese refugees resettling in the United 
States.8  These experiences of serving refugees and of protesting government military 
policy—often outside of established legal means—helped pave the way for the dawn of the 
sanctuary movement in the early 1980s. 
                                                
6 For various refugee testimony documents, see WHS, Records of the CRTFCA, 1982-1992, M93-153, Box 4, 
Foldes 55-56 and M2004-170, Box 2, Folder 4. 
7 Larry Stammer, “Illegal Alien Smuggling: New Partner,” Los Angeles Times, February 3, 1983, A16.  
Crittenden, Sanctuary, 62-63. 
8 Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, Who Spoke Up?: American Protest Against the War in Vietnam, 1963-
1975, Garden City 1984, 263; Helen Fein, Congregational Sponsors of Indochinese Refugees in the United 
States, 1979-1981, London 1987. 
12  
 The connections between Central America and US congregations, particularly 
Catholic congregations, were also instrumental in the emergence of the movement.  
American religious communities took note of two particularly gruesome events in El 
Salvador, the killing of four American religious workers in El Salvador in 1980 and the 
assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero of San Salvador that year, who had criticized the 
Salvadoran government and called for peace, earlier that same year.9  Many sanctuary 
activists among Catholics and non-Catholics alike paid homage to his struggle for peace and 
commemorated his death.10  But even these conditions were insufficient to muster a truly 
large number of participants for the sanctuary movement.  Some Americans opted instead for 
other movements protesting the Reagan administration’s Central America policy like Pledge 
of Resistance and Witness for Peace, which protested through demonstrations, sit-ins in 
Washington, D.C., and other events that raised awareness about the policy.11  Unlike the 
governing bodies of most other mainline US churches, the National Council of Catholic 
Bishops never endorsed the movement.12   Fundamentalist Christians either avoided the 
movement altogether or actively supported the Reagan administration’s efforts.13  There was 
thus by no means a unified Christian response to the Central American refugee crisis and to 
                                                
9 Crittenden, Sanctuary, 87-89.  Miriam Davidson, Convictions of the Heart: Jim Corbett and the Sanctuary 
Movement, Tucson 1988, 17. 
10 Virginia Escalante, “Housing Emigres Obeys God’s Law, Church Contends,” Los Angeles Times, November 
17, 1983, LB1. 
11 Smith, Resisting Reagan, 70-86. 
12 At the time of the sanctuary movement, the American Catholic Church was organized both locally and 
nationally.  The fundamental level of church jurisdiction was the diocese, a grouping of parishes under the 
authority of a bishop.  Dioceses under the authority of an archbishop or cardinal (higher positions in the 
American hierarchy) were known as archdioceses.  Nationally, bishops, archbishops, and cardinals met in the 
National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB). Timothy A. Byrnes, Catholic Bishops in American Politics, 
Princeton 1991, 12-17.  By the early 1980s, the conference was the largest it had ever been, with over 350 
bishops.  Edward K. Braxton, “American Bishops Meet,” America, Vol. 146, No. 20, May 22, 1982. 
13 See, for instance, “Christians Oppose TV Evangelist’s Aid to Right-Wing Groups in Central America,” press 
release of Synapses, Inc., April 13, 1985; WHS, Records of the CRTFCA 1982-1992, M2004-170, Box 1, 
Folder 7. 
13  
US foreign policy in Central America, and the sanctuary movement must be understood as 
one among many Christian responses to these situations. 
“The most important place in the world”: Central America in Reagan’s Prosecution of the 
Cold War 
 In 1980, Ronald Reagan unseated Jimmy Carter and succeeded him as the president 
of the United States.  This election inaugurated a new era in American history marked by the 
ascendancy of conservatism in political life, and though Reagan was constrained in his ability 
to effect a significant rightward shift in domestic policy, his administration’s foreign policy 
largely fits contemporary American memory of him as committed to far right-wing policies.  
Reagan demonstrated his anticommunist bona fides by organizing support for the mujahidin 
fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and training and organizing Central American 
opposition to left-wing insurgencies and governments, in addition to several smaller military 
engagements.14 
 By aiding different parties in military conflicts around the world while refusing to 
commit American troops to these conflicts, Reagan continued what was known as the Nixon 
Doctrine, Richard Nixon’s policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s of fighting Communism 
by funding anticommunist forces abroad without directly risking American lives.  Nixon 
expected American allies to fight their own wars with their own manpower, though the US 
could provide additional economic and military aid.  Nixon had developed this policy in 
response to domestic opposition to the Vietnam War.  The antiwar movement in the United 
States protested the government’s support for the Saigon government in South Vietnam and 
                                                
14 Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Reagan Administration and Coercive Diplomacy: Restraining More Than 
Remaking Governments,” Political Science Quarterly 106 (Spring 1991): 58. 
14  
the large and rising death toll for American troops, and by mid-1973 Nixon had withdrawn 
virtually all American combat troops from Vietnam.15  But Washington under Nixon and 
Gerald Ford continued to support the South Vietnamese, even expanding some fronts of the 
war, as in the secret bombing of Cambodia to eliminate Vietcong outposts in 1969.  US 
support continued until Saigon fell to a North Vietnamese military offensive in 1975.16  For 
years afterward, the country experienced the so-called “Vietnam syndrome,” a strong popular 
aversion among ordinary Americans to the use of US military force against countries around 
the world that Washington considered proxies of the Soviet Union.17 
 Reagan criticized many of Nixon’s policies, and many in the Reagan administration 
hoped to “cure” the Vietnam syndrome.  In at least one way, however, the administration 
embraced Nixon’s legacy by effectively continuing the Nixon Doctrine in the form of a 
“rollback” policy.  Neoconservatives—hawkish former Democrats who were virulently 
anticommunist—and others in Reagan’s White House team balked at Nixon’s policy of 
détente with the Soviet Union and believed that open and aggressive military force was 
necessary to check the threat of Soviet influence and world Communism.18  Reagan 
emphasized that he would break from the traditional policy of “containment”—in which 
Washington prevented the spread of Communism outside of those countries in which it 
already existed—to one of “rollback.”  Under the new policy, the United States, as the 
supreme military power and moral beacon among nations, would mount an aggressive 
campaign to shrink the size of the Communist world and eventually crush this system 
                                                
15 Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, Who Spoke Up?: American Protest Against the War in Vietnam, 1963-
1975, Garden City 1984, 403. 
16 Ibid., 217. 
17 Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008, New York 2008, 153. 
18 Ibid., pp. 51-52, 153. 
15  
altogether.19  In reality, Reagan’s approach was neither as revolutionary nor as aggressive as 
he claimed.  The line between containment and rollback had always been ambiguous; the 
Eisenhower administration, for instance, expressed support for containment, but during the 
Korean War US-led UN forces pushed past the original border between North and South 
Korea, moving nearly to the Chinese border in an attempt to eradicate Communism in the 
Korean peninsula altogether.20  And despite his aggressive militarist rhetoric, Reagan almost 
completely avoided deploying troops to any conflict during his presidency, instead favoring 
the Nixon Doctrine approach of fighting Communism through proxies, as he did in 
Afghanistan and Central America. 
While the Reagan administration’s aggressive rhetoric of rollback largely served as a 
rejection of Nixon’s détente policy, it also repudiated the liberal human rights rhetoric of 
Reagan’s presidential predecessor, Jimmy Carter.  Carter, like Reagan, rejected the Nixon 
and Ford administrations’ policy of détente, but he also rejected the rhetoric of Cold War 
militarism that Reagan would adopt in favor of a foreign policy based on human rights.  
Carter promised to conduct US relations with other nations on the basis of their respect for 
the rights of their citizens, though the realities of the international arena constrained his 
inability to do so.21  Such an approach was anathema to the Reagan administration, and Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, a political scientist at Georgetown University who became Reagan’s ambassador 
to the United Nations, provided an intellectual framework for Reagan’s foreign policy that 
also expressed the differences between Reagan’s and Carter’s positions.  In her writing, she 
revived a distinction between “authoritarian” and “totalitarian” states.  In both types of state, 
the government restricted democracy and freedom through repression, but Kirkpatrick 
                                                
19 Grandin, Empire’s Workshop, 5-6. 
20 Max Hastings, The Korean War, London 1987, 138-142, 173. 
21 Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, 99. 
16  
considered the former to be amenable to eventual regime change.  Totalitarian states like the 
Soviet Union, however, gripped by ideological fervor, simply could not move toward 
economic and political freedom and had to be opposed by force.  The liberal internationalism 
of Carter was wildly optimistic, she said, and the only way for Washington to truly comport 
itself morally was to forcefully oppose evil totalitarian regimes.22  Yet this attempt to 
distinguish Reagan’s position from Carter’s was just as problematic as the attempt to 
differentiate Reagan and Nixon.  Though Kirkpatrick’s view described a Carter whose 
myopic emphasis on human rights made him soft on Communism, human rights rhetoric 
implied an element of anti-Communism—he would deploy it, for instance, to criticize 
crackdowns on dissenters in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc in early 1977.23  Carter’s 
foreign policy was also in many cases overtly anti-Communist.  He supported the Shah of 
Iran, a staunch anti-Communist ally, in spite of human rights abuses in that country.24  
Rhetorical differences between Reagan and Carter thus exaggerated the substantive 
differences in their respective foreign policies. 
Despite these ambiguities, the Reagan administration heavily pushed its aggressive 
rhetoric of militarism and anti-Communism, and it saw the opportunity to topple the leftist 
Sandinista regime, which took power in Nicaragua in 1979, and aid the Salvadoran and 
Guatemalan governments in fighting leftist insurgencies in those countries as the perfect 
occasion to take on Kirkpatrick’s crusade against totalitarianism and implement rollback.25  
In the late 1970s and 1980s, Central America faced a slew of political and military crises 
affecting virtually the entire region.  Leftist militants had risen up in El Salvador and 
                                                
22 Grandin, Empire’s Workshop, 73-78. 
23 Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, 106. 
24 Ibid., 99-100. 
25 Grandin, Empire’s Workshop, 110-112. 
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Guatemala in an attempt to overthrow these countries’ military dictatorships, and the FSLN, 
or “Sandinistas,” had successfully overthrown the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua and now 
faced a counterrevolutionary insurgency in the form of the “contras,” a loose coalition of 
conservative and former regime elements.  These conflicts emerged in the context of a long 
history of social inequality and civil unrest.26  The Spanish conquest of Central America in 
the 16th century introduced a strict hierarchy in which landowners maintained their wealth 
and power through practices of violence toward and exploitation of largely indigenous 
agricultural laborers.  Resistance by natives and peasants alternated with brutal repression by 
the elites.  In the second half of the twentieth century, these conditions only worsened.  
Farmers came to devote more land to export crops than basic food, greatly increasing rural 
poverty and malnutrition.  Changing agricultural practices also augmented the number of 
landless peasants.  These factors, in combination with volatile commodities prices and 
earthquakes that struck Nicaragua and Guatemala in the 1970s, pushed the misery of most 
Central Americans passed the critical threshold.  Religious, labor, and revolutionary groups 
who had been working to educate and organize peasants over the previous decades seized the 
opportunity, and civil war broke out in all three countries.27 
 The confrontation between Central American states and those calling for reform was 
not originally violent.  It only became so when individuals calling from moderate reforms 
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were radicalized by state repression.  Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, for instance, 
responded to demands for reform with brutal violence, instructing National Guard troops to 
carry out random murder, looting, rape, and property destruction.  As this violence 
intensified throughout the 1970s, Somoza’s domestic and international supporters called on 
him to deescalate his repression and to resign, but he remained remarkably firm.  FSLN 
rebels finally overthrew him in late 1979, but not before he ordered the bombing of 
Nicaraguan cities.  The situation was similar in Guatemala and El Salvador.  Since 1965, an 
insurgency had been fighting Guatemala’s military junta, which had come to power in 1954 
following the US-backed overthrow of a progressive civilian government. In El Salvador’s 
1972 election, right-wing candidate Arturo Molina stole the election from center-left 
reformist José Napoleón Duarte, imprisoning, torturing and exiling him and repressing 
protests with overwhelming violence.  Dissidents, shocked and disillusioned by such 
brutality, increasingly turned to violent resistance to fight the government, which responded 
by increasing the intensity of its repression. 
Each of these militant left-wing resistance movements emerged in the context of local 
economic, social, and political developments.  Though Communists sometimes participated 
in them—they formed part of the Sandinista coalition, for instance, alongside other socialists 
and progressive capitalists and Catholics28—these insurgencies were not the result of Soviet 
influence or instruction.  They were homegrown movements that shared the goal of ending 
government repression and violence and instituting egalitarian policies that would promote 
democracy and prosperity.  Reagan and the neoconservatives, however, failed to take a 
nuanced view of the Central American rebels, seeing them simply as pro-Soviet 
Communists; their struggle appeared to Reaganites as a virus that, if left unchecked, would 
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spread throughout the region and eventually threaten the United States. This outlook first 
emerged on the neoconservative radar in 1980 when the Committee of Santa Fe, a 
conservative think tank-like organization formed shortly before the 1980 election, published 
a paper called “A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties.”  The paper portrayed the 
United States as on the wane in the face of an ascendant USSR and exhorted Washington to 
project its military power to confront this existential threat.  Curiously, the paper focused 
especially on Central America, identifying it as “the most important place in the world” for 
American foreign policy, the region in which America needed to fight Communism most 
intensely.29 
 The Reagan administration moved quickly to adopt this view of Central America and 
make the region the centerpiece of its foreign policy.  The White House organized a domestic 
and worldwide support network to ship arms to the Nicaraguan contras, enabling those 
groups more radically opposed to the Sandinistas to develop into a full-fledged, armed 
counterrevolutionary movement.30  Washington directly trained some Salvadoran troops and 
also distributed manuals to them throughout the 1970s and 1980s explaining how to carry out 
effective psychological torture.31  The United States had been providing similar funding for 
the Guatemalan military since the 1954 coup as well, and by the early 1980s these troops 
were a formidable killing machine capable of committing hundreds of civilian massacres in 
the span of a just over a year.32  Central American refugees themselves testified to the US-
backed violence they had observed in the countries.  Many sanctuary churches in the US 
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interviewed the refugees under their care and recorded their accounts of the violence in 
Central America.  The First Universalist Church of Minneapolis, for instance, recorded the 
story of Marlon Machado, a 22-year-old Salvadoran who, along with his mother had been 
imprisoned and tortured by the Salvadoran National Guard and whose father was murdered 
by the army.33  Another refugee, Pedro Antonio Ramos, was a member of the Commission on 
Human Rights of El Salvador and fled the country in June 1983 and eventually found refugee 
in a sanctuary church in Tucson.  In March 1983 the president of the Salvadoran 
Commission, Marianella García Villas, had been killed, the seventh in a string of the deaths 
of commission members believed to have been carried out by right-wing paramilitary groups 
or “death squads.”  Ramos fled when friends informed him that the government would target 
him next. As he explained in an interview with the Arizona Republic, on behalf of the 
commission he “photographed thousands of corpses and helped families search for hundreds 
of missing and captured Salvadorans.”  He was aware, too, that US support for the 
Salvadoran government facilitated the massacre of thousands and believed that were 
Washington to cut off its aid, the military junta would face “financial collapse” and “would 
be able to realize the necessity for a dialogue with the guerrillas.”34  Ramos’ role in El 
Salvador and his time in the United States perhaps positioned him better than others to 
understand the connection between US aid and government-sponsored violence in El 
Salvador, but every refugee knew all too well the devastation brought upon the populations 
of these Central American nations, for which the United States was partly to blame.  The 
total violence was staggering: Greg Grandin estimates that during Reagan’s eight years as 
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president, his Central American allies killed over 300,000 people, tortured as many or more, 
and forced millions into exile.35 
The American Religious Response to the Refugee Crisis 
 Though the sanctuary movement was one of the most prominent and controversial 
responses by the American religious community to the Central American refugee crisis, it 
was only one among many ways people of faith chose to respond to the US role in that 
region.  Two other social movements stand out alongside sanctuary as prominent examples of 
such dissent: Witness for Peace and the Pledge of Resistance.  Witness for Peace began in 
1983 and focused on Nicaragua.  Lay and ordained religious workers began organizing trips 
directly to Nicaragua so that travelers could observe the civil war for themselves, and 
realizing that the Nicaraguan conflict was not as the US government described it.  Those 
visitors returned to testify to what they had seen and tried to pressure the administration to 
change its contra policy.  Over the course of the decade, over four thousand “delegates” flew 
to Nicaragua for Witness for Peace and returned to tell their stories.36  Pledge of Resistance 
took a somewhat different tack.  Led by Christian peace activists based at the Kirkridge 
Retreat Center in northern Pennsylvania, participants in this movement pledged to travel to 
Nicaragua in the event of a US invasion of that country and directly interfere with the 
invasion.  Pledge activists eventually realized that such an invasion was unlikely, but they 
still carried out a number of acts of protest and civil disobedience.37  As the decade 
progressed, the Pledge picked up steam and spread across the country.  In early February, an 
estimated 42,352 Americans had signed the pledge, and the Summer 1986 Pledge of 
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Resistance Newsletter included a calendar and map of Pledge actions from February to May 
of that year that listed 224 protest actions in 44 states and Washington, D.C.38 
 These were separate movements with distinct origins and organization, but because 
they shared political goals and were founded, organized, and sustained by religious 
Americans, there was some overlap among them.  Though the Chicago Religious Task Force 
on Central America (CRTFCA) focused primarily on overseeing and coordinating the 
sanctuary movement, it participated in a number of other Central America peace activities as 
well, including Witness for Peace and the Pledge of Resistance.  The Task Force supported, 
for instance, several Pledge actions in January 1983 and in an early February mailing 
affirmed its continued commitment to Pledge of Resistance.  This same mailing referred to 
the “mutual support between the sanctuary churches and the Pledge of Resistance.”39  And 
this claim did not simply reflect CRTFCA’s participation in both movements.  In late January 
1985, a national sanctuary convention took place in Tucson to discuss the movement and 
look to its future.  Jim Wallis, the editor of the left-wing Protestant Sojourners magazine and 
one of the leaders of Pledge of Resistance, spoke at this event and encouraged attendees to 
sign the Pledge.40  Moments like these indicate the existence of solidarity and even some 
overlap in participation between the different organizations constituting the US Central 
America peace movement. 
The religious left was by no means the only segment of American Christians to 
respond to the Central American civil wars and refugee crisis.  Conservative, evangelical, 
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and fundamentalist churches also became politically engaged with these issues, though to a 
large extent, their engagement took the form of criticizing the sanctuary movement.  The 
March 1985 newsletter of the conservative Institute for Religion and Democracy, for instance 
voiced many of the Reagan administration’s own criticisms of sanctuary—that Salvadoran 
refugees did not really qualify as refugees under international law, that they were instead 
economic migrants, that violence in El Salvador was on the wane, and so on.  The newsletter 
also contained a column titled “Bringing the Revolution Home…” on the national sanctuary 
convention that had taken place in Tucson earlier that year.  The column suggested that 
attendees were religious radicals willing to “undertake massive civil disobedience in the 
event of any escalation of U.S. military involvement in Central America primarily by 
occupying federal offices.”  It also claimed that some sanctuary members hoped to “make the 
refugee community in the U.S. an arena for radicalizing Salvadorans before their return to El 
Salvador.”41  This latter worry echoed what many conservatives feared and what a 1985 
report by a conservative think tank known as the Council for Inter-American Security 
claimed: that the sanctuary movement sought to “spread Latin American ‘liberation 
theology’ (which maintains that Jesus Christ was a Marxist) to the North American religious 
community.”42  Conservative religious critics generally saw the religious and humanitarian 
justifications for sanctuary as a façade that disguised sanctuary activists’ true, radical left-
wing convictions and conspiracies.  The conservatives oscillated between seeing Salvadoran 
and Guatemalan refugees as simple economic migrants who did not qualify as refugees and 
seeing nearly every refugee as an actual or likely “Marxist-Leninist” revolutionary whose 
radicalism threatened US efforts to quash “Communism” in Latin America as well as the 
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security, prosperity, and freedom of the United States itself.  In this view, sanctuary workers 
appeared to be irresponsible law-breakers helping non-refugees settle in the United States or 
dangerous radicals themselves, complicit in an assault on America and the free world. 
In addition to vigorously criticizing the sanctuary movement, the Christian Right also 
actively supported the Reagan administration’s Central America policy.  Such political 
engagement was a relatively new phenomenon for American evangelicals.  Traditionally they 
had preferred to stay aloof from American politics, but as the power of the federal 
government expanded after World War II and began regulating areas like public morality and 
abortion—areas in which the authority of religious leaders had previously been dominant—
they began an active engagement in politics and became an important voting and support 
bloc for conservatives in the late 1970s and 1980s.  Feeling that Jimmy Carter had not 
effectively promoted evangelical interests during his tenure as president, Christian Right 
organizations such as Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority and the Religious Roundtable rallied 
around Ronald Reagan in the 1980 election.43 
Perhaps the greatest example of evangelical support for Reagan’s Central America 
policy was the provision of material aid by the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) to the 
Nicaraguan contras.  CBN was a TV broadcasting company owned by Pat Robertson, one of 
the leading evangelical personalities of the 1980s.  In early 1984, the Virginian-Pilot ran a 
story indicating that CBN had been shipping goods to Central America for free, using Navy 
ships, a practice that was illegal without official Congressional approval.44  Further details 
emerged over the course of the following year, and by mid-1985 it was clear that CBN had 
been supplying food aid to Nicaraguans and military aid to the contras to the tune of $7 
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million.  On The 700 Club, CBN’s flagship religious talk show, Robertson had repeatedly 
requested that viewers contribute funds for these activities, which were known as Operation 
Blessing.  CBN denied the claim that they had aided the contras and insisted its aid program 
was nonpolitical, but an anonymous administration official allegedly admitted that Operation 
Blessing had allowed the CIA to divert more funds to arming the Nicaraguan rebels.45  A 
Sojourners article later pointed out that even CBN’s food relief efforts were harmful; the way 
CBN distributed its food aid forced displaced Nicaraguans in Honduras to relocate to more 
areas closer to civil war conflict zones, and their precarious positions in these dangerous 
zones increased their dependency on this aid.  Sojourners claimed, too, that funds raised for 
these purposes often went directly to the contras instead. The article also noted that CBN was 
not the only private organization aiding the contras; it included a table listing other 
organizations that had contributed millions of dollars to the rebels, including the World Anti-
Communist league and Friends of the Americas, a Baton Rouge-based aid organization 
founded by Louisiana Representative Louis Jenkins that operated on the Nicaragua-Honduras 
border.46  All these organizations were in fact part of the Reagan White House’s public-
private support network for Central American policy that included other religious 
organizations like Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Church, businessmen, drug traffickers, 
private security firms, ex-military men, and even states like Saudi Arabia and Taiwan.47  
CBN’s Nicaraguan aid operation was thus quite political, enmeshed as it was in a network 
centered in Washington and Reagan’s administration. 
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The religious right and left mobilized the most enthusiastic responses to the Central 
American refugee crisis, but moderates and other religious individuals of complex political 
affiliations engaged with the crisis as well.  Catholic bishops constituted one of the most 
interesting such groups. Their stance on these matters is difficult to classify as strictly left-
wing, liberal, or conservative.  In some ways, this ambiguity is not surprising; throughout the 
20th century, many bishops had mixed conservative opinions on some social issues with 
“liberal” attitudes about economic and social justice, and their stance toward sanctuary 
largely reflected this history.48  Whether or not they endorsed sanctuary efforts on behalf of 
refugees (which were potentially illegal), many bishops supported “extended voluntary 
departure” for Salvadorans, a form of safe haven in the United States that did not grant the 
refugees asylum but allowed them to remain in the United States nonetheless.49  They 
remained divided over whether sanctuary was an appropriate response to the crisis, however, 
and many shied away from it because they believed it illegal.50  This aversion to civil 
disobedience and a sympathy for the refugees’ plight often produced complex and creative 
responses among the bishops, as with Archbishop John Mahony of Los Angeles, who 
favored strong support for Central American refugees but refused to endorse sanctuary and 
rejected any suggestion that he was “liberal.”51  Positions like Mahony’s indicate that 
religious responses to sanctuary encompassed a wide variety of attitudes and strategies, many 
of which did not easily fit a simple left-right model of political engagement. 
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Sanctuary Emerges 
Before Southside Presbyterian’s declaration in Tucson of public sanctuary in early 
1982, religious-based refugee work there lacked a coherent intellectual framework.  
Individuals like Jim Corbett and his colleague, Southside pastor and sanctuary co-founder 
John Fife, simply observed the suffering and struggles of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
refugees arriving from Mexican and did all they could to help them.  Initially, their charisma 
and enthusiasm and the support of their religious communities sustained their work.  Both 
men were part of the Tucson Ecumenical Council (TEC), a coalition of 60 churches in the 
Tucson area, which organized some of the earliest refugee aid in the country.  In addition to 
providing food and shelter to refugees when possible, as early as 1980 the TEC began 
working with the Manzo Area Council, a private agency that helped undocumented 
Hispanics deal with their immigration difficulties.  The Manzo council and the TEC worked 
together to help bail Salvadoran refugees out of detention and attain court hearings over their 
refugee status, though the work was grueling and ineffective at preventing most 
deportations.52 
Jim Corbett worked with TEC but was very much a loner.  Before joining the TEC’s 
efforts, he wrote two letters to Quakers and other people of faith informing them of the 
Central American refugee crisis and urging them to take steps to aid the refugees.53  He made 
a trip to a detention center in Southern California to see how Salvadoran refugees were being 
treated, and after joining up with the TEC, he made several exploratory trips south of the 
border.  During the summer of 1981, Corbett traveled to Nogales in the Mexican state of 
Sonora and convinced Father Ramón Dagoberto Quiñones to help move Central American 
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refugees across the border.  Throughout the movement Corbett himself made border runs to 
aid this process.54 
Late in 1981 Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS), the federal agency that 
oversaw immigration and refugee matters, informed the TEC that they might be indicted for 
their work, and after considering various responses to this warning, the Tucson group 
decided to go public.  Until this point they had been quietly providing for the basic needs of 
the refugees, but they decided that publicizing their work and embracing the centuries-old 
church tradition of sanctuary would strengthen their position vis-à-vis the government.  The 
provision of church sanctuary was a practice that emerged in the Middle Ages that allowed 
fugitives from the law to take refuge in a church building and remain immune from 
apprehension or prosecution as long as they stayed there. The practice was recognized by 
both medieval European canon law and, as late as the 18th century, by English common law 
as well.  Sanctuary largely died out as a legally recognized practice after this period, but the 
Tucson group traced its legacy through later, similar practices carried out by religious 
individuals, most notably the Underground Railroad of the US antislavery movement that 
smuggled southern slaves to freedom in the north.55 Even more recently, as part of the 
antiwar movement during the Vietnam years, churches ranging from Boston to Honolulu 
gave sanctuary to soldiers who refused to deploy to Vietnam.56  This most recent iteration of 
sanctuary was not very widespread, but TEC had both a long tradition and recent memory to 
draw on as they adopted sanctuary as their working model.  They would house, feed, and 
otherwise assist Central American refugees in full view of the media and the government. 
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The Tucson group became the most famous and influential center of sanctuary 
activity, but the TEC cannot claim full ownership of the origins of the movement.  Sanctuary 
activity arose independently in several other locations along the US-Mexico border as well.  
In 1981, as the TEC was moving from less controversial refugee work to a public sanctuary 
model, other churches in Southern California were considering taking the same step.57  
Southern California church sanctuary workers, however, never developed much independent 
leadership in the movement, and they generally cooperated with and deferred to the Tucson 
activists.  But sanctuary work also emerged independently in Texas, and Texan sanctuary 
activists worked to a large extent independently of Tucson’s influence and authority.  In 
March 1983, for instance, the Catholic diocese of Brownsville opened Casa Oscar Romero, a 
shelter for Central Americans in nearby San Benito.  Casa Oscar Romero was never a 
declared sanctuary, but two of its workers, Jack Elder and Stacey Merkt, were tried (twice in 
Merkt’s case) for violating immigration laws in their sanctuary work.58  Bishop John 
Fitzpatrick of Brownsville was also supportive of sanctuary, though he never explicitly 
endorsed the movement.  He once paid $27,000 of his own money for bail for Merkt and 
Elder, and he testified in their defense of sanctuary workers.59 
As the network of sanctuary churches quickly expanded from its southwestern 
epicenter and spread across the country in 1982, the TEC soon found that it lacked the 
resources to coordinate sanctuary activity at such a large scale.  To help with coordinating 
refugee placement and sanctuary establishment, Corbett and Fife recruited the Chicago 
Religious Task Force on Central America (CRTFCA), a coalition of various religious-based 
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organizations that had formed several years earlier in response to the killing of four 
American religious workers in El Salvador.  CRTFCA’s first act was to organize Chicago’s 
Wellington Avenue Church of Christ as a sanctuary.60  The practice spread a bit slowly at 
first: at the end of 1982, Corbett estimated that the TEC had helped 350 refugees into the 
country (a measly tenth of a percent of undocumented Salvadorans who had entered the 
United States at the time), and Fife claimed that fifteen churches around the country of 
various denominational affiliations had declared themselves sanctuaries.  Support for the 
movement quickly spread, however.  By August 1983, the sanctuary movement had already 
received official endorsements from national religious organizations like Clergy and Laity 
Concerned and the national bodies of several Christian denominations, including mainline 
Protestant bodies like the Presbyterian Church USA, the United Methodist Church, and the 
United Church of Christ, and other Christian groups like the American Friends Service 
Committee, the Mennonites, and the Unitarian Universalists.61  In June 1987, CRTFCA 
claimed that 393 churches and synagogues had declared themselves sanctuaries, a group that 
included Jews, Catholics, and many mainline Protestant denominations.62 
But with this increased activity came increased scrutiny, and on January 10, 1985—
shortly after Ronald Reagan’s reelection—an undercover INS investigation of the movement 
culminated in the delivery of indictments to sixteen sanctuary workers, including Fife, 
Corbett, and other key Tucson sanctuary workers and TEC members.63  The federal 
government had charged them with a variety of crimes related to illegally helping the 
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refugees, most notably conspiracy to smuggle refugees into the country.64  Judge Earl H. 
Carroll, who presided over the trial, strongly influenced the shape the trail would take.  He 
forbade the sanctuary activists from defending their actions on the basis of their moral or 
religious commitments and made it impossible for them even to mention that Washington 
might have failed to live up to refugee law or mistreated refugees.65  Still the trial dragged on 
well into 1986, and while it returned convictions for most of the accused, their punishments 
were light.  (Jim Corbett, remarkably, was found not guilty of all charges.)66  Despite worries 
that the trial would irreparably damage the movement, the number of sanctuaries nationally 
continued to climb for several years, though the strength and centrality of the Tucson group 
did diminish after the trial.67  The trial also highlighted philosophical issues that had plagued 
the movement since its inception.  Was the provision of sanctuary primarily a humanitarian 
act, or was it better understood as political protest?  Was it a form of civil disobedience made 
permissible by fidelity to a higher, religious law, or could it be considered in fact to be legal?  
Sanctuary workers around the country could not settle on an answer to these questions, and to 
some extent the TEC and the CRTFCA represented two philosophical poles in the 
movement.  Differences between these two groups had become intense by late 1984 and were 
threatening to divide the movement, and the 1985 indictments and the show of solidarity they 
prompted were likely the only factor that prevented a major split.68 
The CRTFCA understood the practice of sanctuary as a highly politicized and even 
radical activity.  Conscious of the variety of understandings of sanctuary that had proliferated 
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during the first years of the movement’s existence, the Task Force at one point put together a 
document summarizing its own philosophy of sanctuary as well as the TEC’s.  According to 
this document, the CRTFCA understood sanctuary work as “choosing to side with refugees 
fleeing U.S. sponsored violence of El Salvador and genocide in Guatemala” through 
“massive resistance,” one component of which was churches “deciding to break immigration 
law.”  In other words, the CRTFCA saw sanctuary work as illegal, as a form of civil 
disobedience.  Though it considered its guiding principle “solidarity with the people of 
Central Ameirca,” the Task Force saw its work less in “humanitarian” than in political terms.  
The document expressed sanctuary work as a monumental clash between religious 
Americans and the US government, and as such seeing sanctuary as a form of political 
disobedience became even more important to the CRTFCA.69 In this view, the public nature 
and even radicalism of breaking the law made sanctuary appear a more powerful tool than it 
would if simply understood in humanitarian terms, that is, as a means of providing aid to 
suffering refugees without challenging government policy in illegal or otherwise subversive 
ways. 
Though the TEC also acknowledged the political dimension of sanctuary work, it 
preferred instead to emphasize a legal and more humanitarian understanding of the practice 
of sanctuary.  Jim Corbett was particularly devoted to this interpretation, and he took up the 
task of explicating his philosophy in “The State, the Law, and the Sanctuary Movement,” an 
essay he wrote in mid-1985. Corbett attempted in this essay to deconstruct the dilemma of 
choosing between religious law and earthly law, arguing that it is both a legal and a religious 
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imperative for faith communities to offer sanctuary and that these two domains did not in fact 
make use of separate logics and jurisdictions. 
 Corbett opened by forcefully laying out that dilemma faced by most participants in 
sanctuary: congregations who participated in the movement “consider the practice of 
sanctuary to be integral to the practice of their faith.  The U.S. Justice Department considers 
it to be a criminal conspiracy.”70  Corbett noted that congregations join the practice of 
sanctuary “because this is fundamental to human decency and to the practice of prophetic 
faith,” and that as a result legal questions are an “afterthought.”  But failure to consider the 
legal dimensions of sanctuary put sanctuary participants at a disadvantage, ceding ground to 
the federal government and courts and allowing the government and courts to knock out one 
of the central supports of the movement.  Indeed, Corbett did not question the legality of 
sanctuary; for him, if “migrant Salvadorans and Guatemalans are refugees rather than ‘illegal 
aliens’”—and he did not doubt they were—“then we are obliged by international law to 
protect them from the officials who are capturing and returning them.”  He believed that the 
“right to protect war victims and the persecuted is a practice of our Covenant faith that is 
established by the existing body of humanitarian and human rights law.”  By claiming this 
right, Corbett also emphasized the fundamental agreement between religious and legal 
justifications for sanctuary.  This concordance was important to his message, but because his 
audience already enjoyed the confidence endowed by their religious convictions, he devoted 
this essay to the legality of sanctuary, ultimately contending that it was not only permissible 
but also incumbent on communities of faith to practice sanctuary. 
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 To bolster this claim, Corbett was careful to reiterate his view of the state of affairs 
that necessitates the practice of sanctuary in the first place: the Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
governments’ reign of terror against its own citizens that forces them to seek asylum to the 
north and the United States’ complicity in this violence.  He summed up his view succinctly: 
During recent months, refugees have surged out of El Salvador.  They report massacres by the 
military that are beyond anything previously suffered.  Most of these mass murders are perpetrated 
by aerial attack in areas that are now free-fire zones.  The idea is to use military assault to uproot the 
people and then to force the survivors into “model villages” under strict military supervision.  The 
process is called “pacification.”  It has become the Pentagon’s final solution to the Third World 
problem.71 
Salvadorans, according to Corbett, suffered from a joint effort by the governments of El 
Salvador and the United States to eliminate domestic opposition to the government through 
the use of brutal military force.  On this understanding, anyone who fled this situation was 
clearly a refugee, someone who “has ‘a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,’” 
according to the UN Refugee Protocol that Corbett cited.72  Moreover, his use of the phrase 
“final solution” tied the situation in Central America to the events that spawned the Refugee 
Protocol in the first place, namely, the war crimes of World War II, including the Nazi 
genocide of the Jews.  Corbett drew this connection more than once, early on rooting the 
principle of sanctuary in “the Nuremburg principles [that] were declared almost 40 years 
ago” and arguing later that, if “unchecked, military pacification of the Third World is likely 
to become as murderous as the death camps.”  By nearly equating the Holocaust with US 
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policy in Central America, Corbett drove home the urgency of aiding Guatemalan and 
Salvadoran refugees and of changing US policy in the region. 
 He also devoted several pages to debunking the Reagan administration’s own 
justifications for its deportation of Salvadoran.  He identified three main defenses offered by 
the government: that, because Mexico could grant refugees asylum, their trips to the United 
States were for economic, not political, reasons; that deported Salvadorans suffered no 
persecution upon their return to El Salvador; and that, since El Salvador was now a 
democracy—in July 1984 Salvadorans elected a Constituent Assembly to draft a new 
constitution in anticipation of new elections—its gross human rights violations were “a thing 
of the past.”73  As for the first defense, Corbett contended that Mexico did not in fact grant 
asylum to Salvadorans and that, as a non-signatory to the UN Refugee Protocol, there was no 
way to make it do so.  Moreover, he suggested that the US may have even been paying 
Mexico to deport Salvadorans and thereby saving Washington the trouble of doing so itself.  
He dismissed the government’s labeling of the refugees as economic migrants as 
“ridiculous,” noting that there was plenty of readily available evidence to bolster their claims 
to refugee status.  Finally, he argued that the Mexico argument was a “false issue,” as 
“nothing in the law permits the U.S. government to return refugees who have resided in or 
crossed other countries, nor does the fact that refugees have economic needs alter their status 
as refugees.”  He responded similarly to the government’s other two defenses of its policy, 
arguing that the administration’s attempts to show that returned refugees did not face 
persecution were a “calculated fraud” and that while El Salvador had taken small steps 
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toward democracy, it remained a military-backed dictatorship that continued to terrorize the 
population. 
 After arguing that US policy violated international refugee law, Corbett attempted to 
demonstrate that the “crisis of legitimacy” this violation created forced the burden of 
enforcing international law on individuals and communities of faith.  “All of us,” he 
declared, “are in a position to check it [military pacification of the Third World] right here at 
home, where it confronts us in the presence of refugees who need to avoid capture.  And, 
whatever our insensitivities, our churches and synagogues are leading the way by providing 
sanctuary.”  Everyone, from individuals to states, is answerable to international law, and 
when one institution (the state) fails to enforce these laws, “[p]rophetic witness is then the 
community’s only nonviolent way to hold the state accountable—which means that it is then 
up to the church74 to serve as the community’s institutional foundation for complying with 
humanitarian and human rights law.”  With this bold claim, Corbett established a continuity 
between the political-legal and religious realms.  International refugee law for Corbett 
embodied principles that accord with both secular, humanistic sensibilities and religious 
obligations.  All institutions and individuals must uphold these principles, and when the state 
fails to do so, the church is “next in line” to establish institutional support for the law.  
According to this interpretation, then, individuals and communities who gave sanctuary did 
not need to choose between their religious and legal obligations; the two were identical. 
 Most strikingly, Corbett concluded by arguing that, given the forgoing claims, 
sanctuary was not a form of civil disobedience as conventionally understood.  Rather, 
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sanctuary was “categorically distinct” from civil disobedience, and “[a]s community with the 
persecuted, sanctuary is the foundation for socially creative peacemaking that is significant 
measure outside the range of civil disobedience.”75  Sanctuary was not the violation of laws 
but the fulfillment of international law that lacks adequate institutionalization in the state.  
Through this creative definition, Corbett capped off his argument for the legality of sanctuary 
and the coincidence of the religious and legal obligations of sanctuary participants.  In a 
rhetorically skillful final sentence, Corbett declared these points “clear but superficial” and 
exhorted his readers “to go deeper,” to explore the relationship of sanctuary religious 
community and law. 
 Inventive and persuasive though his arguments may be, Corbett was only one 
participant in sanctuary, and he was always something of an idiosyncratic loner (and proudly 
so).  That he felt the need to justify the legality of sanctuary and announce that it was not 
civil disobedience shows that these were contested claims.  As a symbol, sanctuary was not 
totally defined, and different participants understood their actions in different ways.  
However, Corbett remained a significant and respected figure in the movement throughout 
the 1980s, and his amateur philosophy and legal theory no doubt resonated with many who 
chose to take on the practice of sanctuary. 
Conclusion 
 The sanctuary movement emerged in the early 1980s thanks to a convergence of 
external and internal factors.  The long postcolonial history of Central America produced the 
conditions for civil war in the 1970s and 1980s, prompting hundreds of thousands of refugees 
to seek asylum in the United States. US involvement in these wars meant that the arrival of 
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these refugees was not just a humanitarian crisis but a “return of the repressed” for the 
Reagan administration, a sign of the violence and destruction in which the administration 
were complicit.  Drawing on centuries-old church traditions and more recent examples in 
American history, many religious individuals across the country formed a movement to 
oppose Reagan’s policy in Central America and to advocate just treatment of Central 
American refugees in the United States, developing the sanctuary movement, Witness for 
Peace, and the Pledge of Resistance.  Sanctuary activists faced stern criticism and resistance 
from religious and secular conservatives and from the Reagan administration, but they 
persisted in their activism throughout the decade. 
 Despite the prominence of Protestants like Corbett and Fife in the movement, 
American Catholics also played a central role in sanctuary work throughout this decade-long 
endeavor.  A Redemptorist priest, Father Ricardo Elford, worked with John Fife from the 
earliest days of sanctuary.  Darlene Nicgorski of the School Sisters of St. Francis was one of 
the most vocal and radical of the sanctuary activists working out of Tucson.  Father Ramón 
Quiñones, a priest in Nogales, Mexico, helped refugees on their way across the border to the 
Tucson group.  And this strong representation of Catholics among the Tucson activists and 
their closest associates mirrored Catholic work in the sanctuary movement more broadly.  
Priests, religious, and lay Catholics joined the movement with an enthusiasm and a 
willingness to challenge religious and government authorities that were unprecedented in 
American Catholic history.  Their work would constitute a creative response to the politics of 
the moment, but they would draw on radical Catholic traditions stretching back to the early 
20th and even 19th centuries to mount their challenge to secular and religious authority. 
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II 
 
“My Actions Were Morally Compelled” 
 
American Catholic Activists in the Sanctuary Movement 
 
 One of the most remarkable features of the sanctuary movement was its ecumenism, 
its ability to draw together a variety of American Catholics, Protestants, and Jews to support 
Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees.  The Tucson Ecumenical Council included Quakers, 
Presbyterians, Catholics, Methodists, and other Protestants, and as early as the end of 1982, 
Fife estimated that fifteen Catholic, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Methodist, Episcopalian, 
Unitarian, and Quaker congregations had become sanctuaries.1  But this expression of 
interdenominational and interreligious unity could also obscure the differing reasons that 
prompted individuals and groups to join the sanctuary movement.  Jews and Christians, for 
instance, were likely motivated by broadly different factors to become involved, and even 
among Christians, different people chose to join the sanctuary movement for a variety of 
reasons.  Catholics were especially driven by dynamics within the Catholic Church and 
within the history of American Catholic social engagement in the twentieth century.  
Catholics were also some of the most significant players in the movement.  Among the 
founders of the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America (CRTFCA) were several 
Catholic groups or ecumenical groups with a strong Catholic presence, including Clergy and 
Laity Concerned and the National Coalition of American Nuns.2  Moreover, Catholics 
consistently represented one of the largest groups participating in sanctuary.  By mid-1987, 
almost a quarter of the nearly 400 congregations that had declared themselves as public 
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sanctuaries were Catholic.  And, of course, Catholicism played a significant role in the 
Central American context as well.  Church officials were one of the primary targets of state-
sponsored violence in Central America, and virtually all of the refugees were themselves 
Catholics, all of which made the crisis a concern of the global Catholic Church.3  Given this 
prominence, it is clear that a grasp of the dynamics of Catholic sanctuary work is essential to 
understanding the movement as a whole. 
The centrality of America Catholics to the sanctuary movement is even more 
surprising given that, in an earlier era of American history, Catholics would not have been 
likely to take part in this sort of social engagement at all.  Prior to the mid-20th century, the 
majority of American Catholics lived in ethnically isolated urban immigrant communities.  
Their interest in political engagement did not extend beyond local affairs in which bishops 
protected the interests of their embattled flocks, which faced anti-Catholic hostility in a 
majority-Protestant society.4  On the question of war and other divisive national issues, to a 
large extent bishops adhered to a “superpatriotic” philosophy, consistently siding with federal 
policy and against civil disobedience to demonstrate that Catholicism and American 
citizenship were not at odds.5  It was not until the second half of the 20th century and 
especially after the liberalizing reforms of the Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s that 
American Catholics began to dissent in large numbers from dominant views on American 
patriotism and Catholic piety and venture en masse into social engagement and political 
protest, so that even the sanctuary movement in the 1980s was still experimental, an 
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opportunity for Catholics to work out practices and justifications of social and political 
engagement. 
 Though the sanctuary movement was a creative response to a troubling political and 
humanitarian crisis, in these acts of creativity Catholic sanctuary activists drew on a 
significant tradition of socially conscious thought and practice that reached back to the 19th 
century but was particularly evident beginning in the 1960s.  In fact, two strands of Catholic 
social engagement—a pacifist, antiwar tradition, represented by Dorothy Day’s Catholic 
Worker movement and the Catholic Left of the Vietnam Era, and Catholic social work on 
issues related to race, ethnicity, and immigration ongoing since the 1940s—came together in 
the 1980s and found a powerful synthesis in sanctuary work.  But the Vietnam-era Catholic 
Left was the most recent ancestor of Catholic sanctuary work, and as such it exercised the 
greatest influence over the form of Catholic sanctuary work and structured the ways these 
other historical currents found expression in this work.  This influence found expression in 
Catholic sanctuary activists’ emphasis on anti-militarism and their willingness to challenge 
the authority of both church and state, in what they saw as an effort to push both to return to 
the foundational principles from which they had strayed.  In doing so, Catholics not only 
sought success in the political realm but also often turned to their own institutions, criticizing 
the church on matters related to sanctuary as well as other issues of ecclesiastical life. 
Progressive and Radical Roots 
Although progressive and left-wing Catholic social movements only began to flourish 
in the 1960s, the historical forces undergirding these movements began as far back as the 19th 
century. The nineteenth-century American Catholic world was dominated by 
“ultramontanism,” a an international Catholic revival movement that increased the authority 
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of the Vatican and enriched the lives of Catholic institutions like schools and churches.  As 
the movement swept through the United States, Mass attendance increased, and the American 
Church saw a greater focus on Vatican-approved devotions and a growth in religious 
vocations.  And while American Catholic political engagement has always taken diverse 
forms, the atmosphere created by the ultramontane revival shaped the dominant form that 
such engagement took at the time.  Ultramontanism was characterized politically by its 
strong “anti-liberal” or “anti-modern” stance.  In an America dominated socially and 
culturally by liberal Protestants, many Catholics saw themselves as pitted against the rest of 
society, defending the Catholic values of community, religious hierarchy, and obedience 
against the corrosive influence of liberal individualism.6 This anti-liberalism lies at the root 
of the view that the American Church at this time was especially conservative or reactionary, 
and this stance often did produce a climate hostile to progressive causes.  Very few American 
Catholics, for instance, were abolitionists, and those who were faced harsh criticism from 
their fellow Catholics.7 But the political significance of ultramontanism was more complex, 
and the importance of community resulted in stances that contemporary observers might see 
as left leaning.  Ultramontane anti-liberalism also implied a rejection of “laissez-faire” 
economic policies.  For instance, Rerum Novarum, a papal encyclical issued in the early 
1890s, drew heavily on a social vision that endorsed unions as means of protecting the 
working classes as well as government intervention in the economy to ensure good wages.  
Some American bishops, taking this vision to heart, supported Catholic unionism in the late 
19th century.8  Rather than see these two faces of ultramontanism as contradictory, 
nineteenth-century American Catholics saw them as a direct consequence of their faith.  
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Though it may have been difficult to neatly label these stances, they all sprang from a 
commitment to the Catholic community and a reject of liberal Protestantism. 
A new strand of progressive Catholic thought took shape in the early 20th century.  
Though the church remained conservative with respect to certain social issues like sexuality 
and tended to orient Catholic life around religious education and devotion, many bishops and 
priests began developing social teachings that emphasized concern and care for the poor and 
called for a more just economic order.9  Initially the bishops led these initiatives.  In February 
of 1919, the newly formed National Catholic Welfare Council—the first national body of any 
kind established by the American church hierarchy—published its Program of Social 
Reconstruction, a letter calling for progressive economic policies in the wake of World War 
I.  The letter, authored by Monsignor John A. Ryan, who would later head the NCWC’s 
social action department, called for a national labor board, public works, a minimum wage, 
social insurance, and other related policies.10  Priests and lay Catholics quickly took on a 
similar sort of social activism.  The Catholic Action movement, promoted by the papacy and 
left-leaning American priests in the 1930s, encouraged lay Catholics to observe and evaluate 
their environment in relation to the gospel and to act accordingly.  In the United States, 
adherents to the Catholic Action method began to promote progressive social positions, 
supporting labor unions and pushing Notre Dame university to admit black students, all while 
emphasizing the importance of a strong Catholic spiritual life.  The American version of 
Catholic Action, an international movement, was unique in its particularly strong emphasis 
on the independence of laity within the American Church. 
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This current of social justice work that emerged in American Catholicism after World 
War I encompassed a wide variety of practices, some of which were more radical than others.  
Some work by practitioners of Catholic Action may have been considered radical, but 
another radical trend emerged in the 1930s with the birth of Dorothy Day’s Catholic Worker 
movement. The movement was established in 1933 when Dorothy Day, a former left-wing 
political activist and recent Catholic convert, and Peter Maurin, a French Catholic immigrant, 
began selling a newspaper called The Catholic Worker.  The paper espoused service and 
charity for the poor and advocated love and pacifism. A network of “houses of hospitality” 
quickly grew up on the basis of this philosophy.  Catholic Workers who joined these houses 
opted for lives of voluntary poverty and pacifism in which they served the poor, homeless, 
and unemployed.  Thanks largely to Dorothy Day’s charisma, this radical Catholic movement 
grew to a national scale and has endured to this day.11  In some ways, the Catholic Worker 
movement was less of a departure than it appeared at first.  Dorothy Day hoped, according to 
James T. Fisher, “to transform the Catholic wariness of industrial capitalism from nascent 
theory into a permanent religious counterculture—a ‘sign of contradiction’ to the 
secularizing individualism she had grown so disillusioned with in the years prior to her 
conversion.”12  In this reaction to liberal capitalism and individualism, Day’s project bore an 
unlikely resemblance to the ultramontane anti-liberalism of the 19th century.  But the 
importance of pacifism in the movement also set an important precedent for Catholic 
radicalism in the decades to come.  Emerging after one world war and on the eve of another, 
the Catholic Worker movement rejected all forms of war, and antiwar and anti-militarist 
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stances would be essential to left-wing Catholic activism in the 1960s and 1970s as well as to 
Catholic sanctuary activism in the 1980s. 
Because of the incorporation of progressive and radical views into Catholic teaching 
and practice from above and below, the next several decades saw an increase in Catholic 
social engagement.  From the 1930s to the 1950s, a network of racial justice organizations 
began to develop among American Catholics that emphasized a biracial approach to 
problems of segregation and discrimination.  Catholic interracial councils sprang up in 
dozens of cities in the north and south as priests and laity worked to improve race relations, 
in part by converting members of Chicago’s black neighborhoods.  These efforts forced the 
workers to confront the race- and class-based injustices with which their potential converts 
lived daily, and as such work received a boost from the broader civil rights movement of the 
1950s and 1960s, many priests went on to work on other racial justice issues, such as fair 
housing.  In an era in which racism were still large problems in the American Church and 
American society more broadly, these interracial councils’ work in challenging structures of 
segregation and discrimination was truly radical.  It represented both an increasing 
acceptance by Catholics that their faith might have profound consequences for social action 
and an expansion of that action into work with new social justice issues.13  The interracial 
councils were also part of a larger story of racial justice work that spanned the country and 
included both African Americans and Latin Americans.  Mexican Americans and other Latin 
Americans also benefited from the turn to racial justice work that took place in the 1940s and 
1950s as Catholics built health clinics and community centers, joined public housing efforts, 
and raised awareness and support for unionization of Latin American farm and factory 
workers.  Latin Americans also continued to face and prejudice and discrimination from 
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Catholics, but the racial justice work of the mid-20th century nonetheless represented a 
significant development in Catholic social action.14 
Some of the most notable figures in the mid-century story of Catholic racial justice 
work were the nuns who joined the “racial apostolate” of the early 1960s.  These “new nuns,” 
as Amy Koehlinger has referred to them, profiting from a burst of education and vocational 
training in the 1950s, abandoned their isolated, socially disengaged “religious apostolate” 
and joined the civil rights work of the 1960s by aiding poor, inner city black communities, 
which became more segregated and poorer as white families moved to the suburbs.15  The 
work was difficult and funding always tenuous, though the nuns often took advantage of 
funding provided by President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty programs.  Despite these 
difficulties, the racial apostolate marked both another important step in the story of Catholic 
social engagement and a shift in the internal structures and self-consciousness of the church 
itself.  As their racial justice work waned at the end of the decade, the nuns began to look 
inward, criticizing the racism and sexism they saw embedded in the church itself.  They 
sought greater authority and autonomy for themselves, relative to priests and bishops.  Their 
engagement with the civil rights movement allowed them to reconfigure their religious lives 
and their religious and personal self-understandings.16 
Though it preceded the church reforms of the 1960s, the flourishing racial apostolate 
of these “new nuns” signaled a new kind of Catholic social engagement that gained support 
from the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), often known as Vatican II.  Under the 
auspices of Pope John XXIII and, after his death, Paul VI, the council called together 
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Catholic bishops from around the world to discuss and implement church reforms in order to 
“modernize” the Church.  The Council produced sixteen main documents spanning a variety 
of topics, from liturgical reform that changed the language of the Mass from Latin to the 
vernacular to a greater emphasis on ecumenism and the importance of religious freedom.17  
Vatican II was the most important and influential event in the Catholic Church in the 20th 
century and thus had far-ranging effects on all aspects of Catholic life, but one of its most 
important consequences lay in the way its reforms made the American Church more 
“democratic.”  For the first time, individual conscience became one of the major sources of 
religious authority for Catholics worldwide.  The Vatican II documents recognized that 
Catholics’ understanding of religious truth was incomplete and constantly evolving. Though 
Catholics were still subject to the authority the Pope and other bishops, they could now look 
to their own consciences as another way to understand their faith and its social and political 
implications.  “As a result of the Council,” argues American historian Jay P. Dolan, 
“Catholics acquired the authority to dissent.”18 
Many Catholics were quick to take advantage of this newfound freedom.  On October 
25, 1965, roughly one hundred Christian and Jewish clergy organized a forum in New York 
City to discuss the war in Vietnam and formed a group they called Clergy Concerned About 
Vietnam.  The organization, which would subsequently rename itself Clergy and Laity 
Concerned About Vietnam (CALCAV), criticized the Vietnam War through the 1960s and 
1970s from a moderate religious viewpoint.  CALCAV had difficulty attracting the support 
of the American hierarchy, but Catholics played a prominent role in the organization from 
the beginning.  Many clergy participating in the October 1965 forum were Catholics, and 
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among CALCAV’s key founders—Rev. Richard Neuhaus, Fr. Daniel Berrigan, and Rabbi 
Abraham Heschel—the first would later convert from Lutheranism to Catholicism, and the 
second, a Jesuit priest, would join his brother Philip in more radical antiwar actions as the 
decade wore on.19  CALCAV wrote letters of protest to the Johnson administration, 
sponsored conferences, and organized protest marches, urging the federal government to seek 
peace in Vietnam.  Catholic voices continued to be important throughout the movement. Fr. 
John B. Sheerin, editor of Catholic World, rebuked those of his co-religionists who supported 
the war.20 
Much of CALCAV’s strength lay in its consistently moderate position—the 
organization never called for anything more radical than a ceasefire and only endorsed legal 
means of protest—but this stance masked ideological tensions in its ecumenical coalition.  As 
the war dragged on and more CALCAV members felt that a cautious antiwar stance was 
inadequate, the organization began to split between those who wished to remain moderate 
and those who favored more radical tactics.21  Though this split never tore the organization 
apart, it did threaten its strength, and by the late 1960s and early 1970s, many members 
would go on to a variety of new projects.  The careers of its leadership reflected this 
diversification.  Richard Neuhaus, for instance, distanced himself from Clergy and Laity 
Concerned (as the group renamed itself)  in the early 1970s, and as a Catholic he later 
became something of a religious “neoconservative.”22  Participation in a liberal antiwar 
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movement did not necessarily mean CALC members would continue along the same political 
trajectory. 
For other Catholics members of CALCAV, participation was a stepping-stone to 
more radical activism.  Daniel Berrigan and his brother Philip, a fellow Catholic priest, were 
perhaps the most prominent example of this leftward shift.  They and a relatively small 
network of other radicals Catholics believed that their faith commitment required them to 
take more direct but still nonviolent action to protest the war.  In late October 1967, Philip 
Berrigan and three compatriots broke into the Baltimore Customs House and poured blood 
on the selective service system’s files.  Berrigan was sentenced to six years in jail for this act, 
but while waiting for his appeal trial, both brothers, along with seven other Catholics broke 
into and burned the files of Selective Service Board #33 in the Baltimore suburb of 
Catonsville.23  The “Catonsville Nine,” as they came to be known, gained instant fame, and 
other radical Catholics targeted draft boards around the country in similar ways.24  The 
“Catholic Left,” as these religious radicals came to be called, remained small and isolated 
from both other radical Catholics and the secular left wing of the antiwar movement.  
Leading radical Catholics like Dorothy Day and the monk Thomas Merton hesitated to 
endorse actions like those of the Catonsville Nine, uncertain that the destruction of property 
was really nonviolent.  At the same time, The Berrigans were themselves wary of allying 
themselves firmly with other groups in the antiwar movement, and the Catholic Left in 
general wanted to avoid that appellation in favor of the term “action community.”  They saw 
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their work as springing not from left-wing political ideology but from an appropriate 
understanding of their faith.25  Despite these divisions, the actions of the Catholic Left were 
prominent and left an indelible mark on American Catholic memory as yet another way that 
faith might prompt social action. 
As the Vietnam War drew to a close in the mid-1970s and the antiwar movement 
faded, Catholic activists found a variety of new causes to take up.  In the 1980s the Berrigan 
brothers founded the Plowshares Movement, an anti-nuclear weapons campaign.26  Though 
its focus on Vietnam ended with the war, CALC lived on to join the fight for various other 
progressive causes.  It, too, helped organize the nuclear freeze campaign to reduce and 
eliminate nuclear weapons worldwide and even joined the Central American peace 
movement as one of the founding organizations in Witness for Peace and in the Chicago 
Religious Task Force on Central America.27  The sanctuary movement thus owed an 
organizational and ideological debt to predecessors in the Catholic Left and the antiwar 
movement. 
The Catholic Left Lives Again 
When Rev. John Fife first became aware of the Central American refugee crisis, the 
first person he turned to for help in working out a response was Father Ricardo Elford, a 
Redemptorist Catholic priest who had moved to Tucson at about the same time as Fife and 
whose ministry focused largely on the poor.  Elford helped Fife better understand the largely 
Catholic environment of the Mexican and Native American neighborhood in which they 
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worked, and together they took on a variety of social reform projects through the 1970s to 
serve their congregants and their neighbors. Fife and Elford began by organizing a small 
prayer vigil for Salvadoran refugees on February 19, 1981, a founding event of sanctuary. 
From that moment on, Elford remained a central member of the Tucson group.28 
A major factor influencing both Fife and Elford to take up sanctuary work was their 
interest in liberation theology, a theology developed by Latin American bishops and clergy 
that prioritized serving the poor and called for economic, social, and political changes that 
would bring an end to oppression and exploitation on the part of the state and upper classes. 
With its roots in the South American bishops’ conference in Medellín, Colombia, in August 
and September of 1968 and in the writings of Peruvian theologian Gustavo Gutiérrez through 
the 1970s, liberation theology expressed a special concern for the poor and others at the 
bottom of the social hierarchy.  It saw Christ as a radical and expressed a vision of the 
Church not as a defender of the status quo but a force for liberation, an instrument with 
which Christians and others might build a more just social and economic order.29  Elford (and 
Fife) criticized the Reagan administration’s policy and took on sanctuary work in large part 
because they did not want to see the practitioners of liberation theology crushed by the 
Central American conflicts, but it would be a mistake to see him or most other sanctuary 
activists as such practitioners themselves.30  Much more important to the philosophy and 
practice of sanctuary for Catholics was the Catholic Left, a specifically American antiwar 
phenomenon whose guiding principles found wider circulation among the sanctuary activists 
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of the 1980s.  Like their predecessors of the 1960s and 1970s, Catholic sanctuary workers 
were unafraid to engage in forms of protest considered illegal by many and certainly contrary 
to the wishes of the Reagan administration and other government actors. 
The Catholic Left network roughly centered on the Berrigan Brothers had comprised 
a relatively small number of people, perhaps never more than 200 or so, but networks of 
Catholic sanctuary activists became much more expansive by the second half of the 1980s.31  
Nationally, Catholics represented one of the largest groups participating in sanctuary. In late 
1986, several months after Judge Earl Carroll had handed down the sentences of Tucson trial, 
there were nearly 60 Catholic sanctuaries nationwide, and by June of the next year that 
number had increased so quickly that almost a quarter of the nearly 400 congregations that 
had declared themselves as public sanctuaries were Catholic.32  Sanctuary work spread 
through all levels of the church as well, involving priests, religious, and lay Catholics.  When 
the CRTFCA established Chicago’s Wellington Avenue United Church of Christ as the city’s 
first sanctuary, many Catholic priests around the country wrote in to express their support.33  
Many religious orders, especially the more liberal Maryknolls, Paulists, and Jesuits, 
supported the movement as well.  The Jesuit magazine America, for instance, published 
articles and editorials in support of the TEC’s sanctuary activists during the Tucson trial.34  In 
some local contexts, Catholics were even more important.  In southeastern Michigan, for 
instance, where the Michigan Interfaith Committee on Central American Human Rights 
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(MICAH) began organizing sanctuary activity in Detroit in 1983, Catholics played a central 
role in sanctuary work from the beginning. By May of 1983, MICAH was seriously courting 
three Detroit churches to become sanctuaries, and on December 15, St. Rita’s Catholic 
Church declared itself a public sanctuary as it agreed to sponsor a family of Salvadoran 
refugees.35  According to a MICAH mailing that preceded the official declaration by several 
days, “St. Rita’s Parish Council voted unanimously to declare sanctuary, basing their 
decision on an overwhelmingly positive survey response of their parishioners.”36  MICAH 
mailings also frequently listed sanctuary supporters in Michigan, and the strong 
representation of Catholics on this list alone reveal how deeply an openness to protest and 
civil disobedience had percolated into the Catholic community.  The back of a flyer from the 
end of the decade listed in tiny type over one hundred Michigan organizations that endorsed 
the “Detroit Sanctuary Project.”  Catholic churches or church boards constituted about half of 
the 35 congregational supporters listed, and religious orders were numerous enough to 
receive their own subsection on the list.37  Even if only a handful of individuals at each 
Catholic sanctuary truly sustained the sanctuary work there, these lists suggest that in the 
state of Michigan alone, those who formed the hard core of Catholic sanctuary activists 
equaled or surpassed in number the several hundred core members of the Vietnam-era 
Catholic Left . 
All of these Catholics, including those who worked on the front lines of the 
movement by helping refugees cross the border or providing sanctuary themselves as well as 
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those who supported sanctuary work verbally or financially, carried on the legacy of the 
Catholic Left in part because of their willingness to defy the law.  Father Tony Clark, a 
firebrand of the Tucson group who worked at the church of the Sacred Heart in Nogales, 
Arizona, was one of the best representatives of this attitude among sanctuary activists.  Clark 
began his work with refugees through standard legal channels, filing paperwork that initiated 
asylum requests for various refugees who had been detained by INS.  When this work not 
only failed to bear fruit but also resulted in the disappearance of each refugee he was 
attempting to help, he felt compelled to turn to sanctuary activism.  In 1982, Clark helped 
turn Sacred Heart into the United States’ first Catholic sanctuary church of the decade, 
offering refugees who had crossed the border a resting place on their way to Tucson.38 
Whether Clark’s sanctuary work constituted illegal activity was a difficult matter of 
law that was not apparent at the time—recall, for instance, the dispute between the TEC and 
the CRTFCA over the question of sanctuary’s legality—but the jury of the 1985-86 Tucson 
trial viewed it unfavorably, handing down a decision that found Clark guilty of harboring 
illegal immigrants.39  But Clark did not concern himself primary with the legality of his acts.  
Aware that he may well have been breaking the law, he persisted in his efforts and criticized 
those who fretted over the legal status of sanctuary work.  In 1986, for instance, shortly after 
his conviction, Clark criticized a 1983 document produced by the American Catholic 
hierarchy that found the practice of sanctuary illegal under American law.  Clark called the 
bishops conference “a bunch of cowards,” disappointed that they had not addressed moral 
reasons for sanctuary work that might conflict with legal considerations.40  His criticism did 
not necessarily challenge the actual findings of the report that sanctuary may have been 
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illegal.  What troubled him was that the legal dimension of the issue seemed to be the only 
dimension with which the bishops were concerned, and he was disappointed that the moral 
obligations of their faith did not prompt the bishops to a fuller consideration of justifications 
for and implications of the sanctuary movement.  In the spirit of the Catholic Left and like 
many of his fellow Catholics sanctuary activists, Clark found that when his faith conflicted 
with the law, his obligation to faith came first.  His moral commitment as a Catholic took 
priority over what he understood as flawed government policy. 
The supreme importance Catholic sanctuary activists gave to the moral obligations of 
their faith did not mean that they were somehow not truly American.  In fact, many Catholic 
sanctuary activists believed that their protest against US foreign policy and immigration 
policy was at the same time a commitment to principles of American law and to the letter of 
American law itself.  In 1986, for instance, the Jesuit Refugee Services/USA, funded in party 
by the Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur, released an informational brochure explaining the 
sanctuary movement and the Jesuits’ participation in it.  The brochure encouraged its readers 
to help the refugees in whatever way they could and noted that “the national office of the 
Jesuit Refugee Service/USA has been authorized by the 10 U.S. Jesuit Provincials to 
‘collaborate with the sanctuary movement to the extent possible,’” which entailed “trying to 
disseminate information about the situation in Central America, the plight of Central 
Americans in the United States, and ‘The Sanctuary Movement.’” Alongside this expression 
of support for sanctuary, the brochure also tried to explain what might motivate Catholics 
and others to join the movement.  It presented the practice of sanctuary as fundamentally “an 
expression of human compassion for fellow human beings in need,” again prioritizing moral 
considerations, but it went on to note the political valence of sanctuary work as well.  “Some 
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congregations,” it stated, “have declared themselves to be sanctuaries because they believe 
that, as citizens of the United States, they share in the responsibility for the military, political, 
and economic violence prevalent in Central America.”  As a result, such congregations had 
two goals: “1. to work for change in U.S. policy which they believe to be in violation of the 
United Nations Charter, international law and the laws of the U.S. and 2. to assist the victims 
of U.S. policies.”41 
Though the brochure avoided endorsing these views outright by attributing them to 
“some congregations,” its presentation of them without any competing views suggests some 
sympathy on the Jesuits’ part with these judgments emphasizing the concordance of moral 
principle with international and American legal obligations—even in opposition to the 
authorities’ application of the law.  While sanctuary work, in this vein, stemmed from 
ostensibly apolitical norms of “human compassion,” it nonetheless had a political valence 
and political consequences.  Sanctuary workers might understand themselves both as good 
Catholics and Christians and as US citizens who could influence government policy by 
urging the Reagan administration to fall in line with its legal obligations, as the activists 
understood them.  And as with their predecessors in the Vietnam-era Catholic Left, the 
central plank of Catholic sanctuary activists’ stance was their opposition to US foreign policy 
and specifically to US involvement in wars in foreign countries.  As both good Catholics and 
good Americans, sanctuary Catholics considered it their responsibility to nudge US policy in 
the “right direction,” because they felt culpable for the immoral acts of their own 
government. 
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The spread of this Catholic Left sensibility among American Catholics meant that 
many lay Catholics also participated with enthusiasm in sanctuary work.  If priests and 
religious often led the charge into sanctuary activism, lay Catholics were the ground troops 
of the sanctuary movement.  They voted in parish councils on whether to turn their churches 
into a sanctuaries, and they formed the bulk of congregations that took Salvadoran and 
Guatemalan refugees into their care.  Often they simply followed the direction established by 
their pastors, who chose whether or not to raise sanctuary as an issue in their congregations, 
but sometimes lay Catholics assumed responsibility for organizing and directing sanctuary 
projects themselves.  Catholic Worker houses were some of the most notable lay Catholic 
organizations to take on sanctuary work.42  And the occasional court case elevated some lay 
Catholics to national prominence.  Jack Elder directed Casa Oscar Romero, a halfway house 
for Central Americans operating in San Benito, Texas, and run by the Diocese of 
Brownsville, and he was tried for his involvement in the sanctuary movement twice; he was 
acquitted in 1985 at the conclusion of his first trial but soon after was convicted along with 
his Casa Oscar Romero colleague Stacey Merkt of transporting Salvadoran refugees into the 
United States.43 
Although most of the organized opposition to Catholic sanctuary work came from 
parts of the American hierarchy or from non-Catholics, lay Catholics occasionally 
distinguished themselves by criticizing or protesting Catholic sanctuary activity.  Individuals 
and small groups who found sanctuary work particularly odious sometimes took it upon 
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themselves to say so publicly and to discourage Catholic groups from endorsing or joining 
the movement.  In the early 1980s, for instance, Mark Rising, a “third-year law student,” 
wrote a letter to the Calvert House in Chicago before this small Catholic organization voted 
on whether to support the Wellington Avenue Church’s decision to become a public 
sanctuary.  He strongly discouraged the Calvert House members from doing so, framing all 
of the refugees as former “insurrectionists” and “terrorists,” the “shielding” of whom 
“might…only encourage more terror and murder (by both sides) in El Salvador.”  He 
considered a vote for sanctuary a sympathy vote for Salvadoran “Marxists,” which might 
send the message that Calvert House approved of the “socio-political system or policies 
offered by the Marxist insurrectionists in El Salvador.”44  Rising echoed much of the 
conservative rhetoric on the Salvadoran situation expressed by the Reagan administration, 
but he also made it clear that he was reacting to what he perceived as an abuse of Catholic 
authority and an unjustified expansion of Catholics’ jurisdiction into the political realm.  His 
conservative attitudes were not a consequence of his faith but a limit on what he allowed his 
faith to imply.  But whatever its significance, Rising’s voice alone meant little; Calvert 
House voted to endorse Wellington’s sanctuary action.45 
In Brownsville, Texas, a Catholic named Mike Rodriguez organized a larger scale 
stand against sanctuary work in the area.  Rodriguez felt that the support for the sanctuary 
movement by the local bishop, John Fitzpatrick, was illegal and unacceptable.  Fitzpatrick’s 
diocese ran Casa Oscar Romero (which was not, however, a declared sanctuary), and 
Fitzpatrick himself testified in the trial of Jack Elder and Stacey Merkt.  Feeling that 
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Fitzpatrick’s sanctuary support essentially constituted support for illegal alien smuggling, 
Rodriguez organized a group called Citizens Concerned for Church and Country, which was 
“opposed to the church mixing in politics.”  During Elder and Merkt’s pretrial hearing, the 
group picketed outside the courthouse.  They also placed an ad in several local newspapers 
calling on local residents to sign a petition calling on the Vatican to investigate Fitzpatrick 
and his superior, Archbishop Patrick Flores of San Antonio.46  As with Mark Rising’s efforts, 
the protests appeared to have little to no effect.  Rodriguez also shared with Rising the belief 
that his church should not involve itself in politics.  Lay Catholic opposition to sanctuary thus 
appears to have sprung from a more cautious views about the relationship between religion 
and politics.  Whether they supported the Reagan administration’s policies in Central 
America or not, lay Catholic opponents of sanctuary shared the belief that Catholics should 
not make their faith the basis of their political decisions.  Even more importantly, however, 
Catholics like Rising and Rodriguez represented yet another face of the expansion of 
religious liberty brought about by Vatican II.  The council’s emphasis made it possible for 
lay Catholics to challenge priests and bishops from both the left and the right.  Rodriguez 
was, after all, a lay Catholic militating against several local bishops, and even this small step 
likely would not have been possible before Vatican II.  The Council opened up a space in 
which ordinary Catholics could dissent from the opinions of their bishops and assert their 
own notions of the limits of proper Catholic behavior and authority.  The dissent of ordinary 
Catholics often may have been as impotent as Rodriguez’s was, but this space for dissent 
nonetheless allowed for the possibility of more powerful forms of protest to break through, as 
it did through the sanctuary movement. 
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Issues of race and ethnicity also colored much of sanctuary activism, since Catholic 
sanctuary work continued a tradition of Catholic social engagement with issues of race and 
immigration. When the Rev. William T. O’Connor of St. Basil Church wrote to the CRTFCA 
in support of the recent sanctuary declaration of Chicago’s Wellington Avenue United 
Church of Christ, he repeatedly expressed the “support and appreciation” of the “Spanish-
speaking members” of his parish.47  And St. Basil was not the only instance of a 
predominantly Hispanic-American congregation expressing strong sanctuary support; for 
many churches, ethnic and national ties served as strong motivators to support or participate 
in sanctuary work.  That virtually all Central American refugees were Catholic meant, of 
course, that all American Catholics had a special relationship to the refugee crisis, and Latino 
and non-Latino Catholics alike acknowledged these connections as they worked to help their 
coreligionists.  But as in the Saint Basil case, ethnic and national connections between 
American congregations and refugees often served as an extra motivation to join the 
sanctuary movement. 
National and ethnic connections did not necessarily guarantee extra enthusiasm for 
sanctuary, however, and in some instances religious, ethnic, and national ties interacted in 
complex ways that both strengthened support for sanctuary and worked against it.  One such 
instance played out in Father Luis Olivares’ Our Lady Queen of Angels Church in Los 
Angeles.  Father Olivares was himself a model progressive Catholic who had devoted much 
of his career to serving Latino communities in the American Southwest.  He had worked with 
Cesar Chavez’s United Farm Workers labor movement in the 1970s and the United 
Neighborhoods Organization in LA, and he presided over a largely Latino congregation that 
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informally counted over 100,000 families in Los Angeles.  He counted among his heroes 
Oscar Romero, the Mexican revolutionary Emiliano Zapata, and the Nicaraguan 
revolutionary Augusto Sandino, after whom the Sandinistas named themselves. And in late 
1985, Olivares opened a new chapter in this activism by declaring Our Lady of Angels, also 
known as the Old Plaza Church, a public sanctuary.  Though his superior, Archbishop Roger 
M. Mahony, refused to endorse or reject the sanctuary declaration for fear of entangling 
himself in a politically divisive debate, Olivares took Mahony’s toleration of the project as a 
form of approval nonetheless and called it “heroic because of the risk of his being 
misinterpreted.”  According to Olivares, the Old Plaza Church had been functioning as an 
“informal sanctuary” for several years, counseling Central American refugees in the area and 
offering shelter to hundreds.48 Our Lady Queen of Angels even sponsored a visit in late 1986 
from Arturo Rivera y Damas, Oscar Romero’s successor as Archbishop of San Salvador, 
during which the archbishop stressed his belief that sanctuary for Central American refugees 
was more important than ever.49 
But sanctuary did not find full support even in the Olivares’ predominantly Latino 
parish.  Olivares commented in an interview with the Los Angeles Times that some of his 
parishioners, usually “people from Cuba, Costa Rica, and sometimes Nicaragua,” expressed 
“negative reactions” to the idea of sanctuary, seeing the movement as “excessively political 
and feel[ing] the church is not the right place for it.”50  A number of factors may have 
underlain these unfavorable attitudes toward sanctuary.  Washington granted Cuban and 
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Nicaraguan refugees asylum with much greater frequency than it did Guatemalan and 
Salvadoran refugees, and Cuban or Nicaraguan parishioners may have disliked a movement 
that might challenge their home countries’ favored refugee status.51   Another LA Times 
article noted that one Nicaraguan member of Olivares’ parish was an “exile…whose father 
was a member of the Somoza regime.”52  It is uncertain what this individual thought of the 
sanctuary movement, but this article indicates that some of the Nicaraguan parishioners may 
have had class-based tied to the toppled Nicaraguan dictatorship or to other Central 
American elites, and their class interests or political allegiances may have superseded any 
ethnic or linguistic solidarity they felt with the refugees.  Sharing a common language or 
ethnicity was not sufficient to predict whether Latinos in the United States would support 
aiding Central American refugees through sanctuary work; the intersection of these factors 
with class and political affiliations complicated this support and divided opinion among 
Latinos in the United States. 
Darlene Nicgorski: A Successor to the “New Nuns” 
Easily the most prominent Catholic in the sanctuary movement was Sister Darlene 
Nicgorski, a US-born Franciscan nun and one of the most passionate members of the Tucson 
sanctuary group.  Years prior to her sanctuary activism, Nicgorski had worked as a 
missionary in Izabal, Guatemala, and there she observed the murder of her pastor, Father 
Tulio Marruzzo, by the government.  She subsequently moved to Chiapas, Mexico, to help 
Guatemalan refugees there and heard from them more stories of government-sponsored terror 
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against Catholic leaders and others.53  Upon returning to the United States in 1982, she read 
up on Central America to better understand her experiences and became involved in 
sanctuary work as a result.  In time, Darlene Nicgorski became one of the greatest advocates 
and defenders of sanctuary as civil disobedience, but she did not limit her criticism to the 
realm of American politics.  As with the “new nuns” of the 1960s, Nicgorski’s activism also 
gave her the opportunity to challenge patriarchal structures within the church and the 
domination of the church hierarchy. 
Understanding her own sanctuary activism as “morally compelled” and “consistent 
with [her] religious beliefs,” Nicgorski was unafraid to draw clear and controversial political 
conclusions from her faith commitment.  She used her sentencing statement during the 
Tucson trial to highlight the stories of those suffering in Central America and of the refugees 
in the United States, and she did not hesitate to defend her sanctuary work as civil 
disobedience.  Unlike Jim Corbett and many others in the Tucson group, Nicgorski believed 
that her sanctuary work was in fact illegal.  Rather than understanding this fact as a liability, 
she saw it instead as a consequence of her fidelity to Catholic moral principles.  She argued 
that laws were “not to be absolutized” and claimed dissent as a prophetic activity.  “Often 
times,” she noted, “the legal system lags behind ‘the sense of right and justice’ as expressed 
by the community.”  Believing the 1980s to be one of those times, she affirmed that her 
ultimate loyalty was to God and to the suffering, and she was willing to flout obedience to 
the law.54 
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In other ways, Nicgorski was heir to the legacy of the “new nuns.”  Amy Koehlinger 
has argued that one consequence of the racial apostolate was to turn nuns inward to their own 
communities, focusing on fighting patriarchal structures within the church and domination by 
the church hierarchy.  Darlene Nicgorski was clearly a product of this more independent, 
feminist turn. Just as the feminist turn of the “new nuns” resulted from work in the racial 
apostolate, Nicgorski’s own turn to feminism and a critique of patriarchy in the church did 
not stem directly from experiences of sexism and discrimination but from her sanctuary 
work.  As she explained to the Boston Globe, “Most victims in the Honduran and Mexican 
[refugee] camps are women and children. Most people in the underground railroad are 
women. Most who have accompanied the refugees on their nighttime desert treks are 
women.”55 
These observations led her to observe patriarchal structures in her sanctuary activism 
and in the Catholic Church as well.  She resented and spoke out against the excited press 
coverage of the Tucson group’s white, male leaders. She noted that while many in the 
Tucson group and most among the sanctuary grassroots in Tucson were women, the media 
fixated on Fife, Corbett, and other men.56  Nicgorski also felt free to criticize the American 
hierarchy’s response to the refugee crisis.  In a May 1986 interview with the National 
Catholic Reporter, she condemned the report by the U.S. Catholic Conference (USCC), one 
of the governing bodies of the American Church, which emphasized the illegality, as the 
bishops saw it, of the sanctuary movement and refused to endorse the movement.57  Such 
criticism was part of a more general critique of the hierarchy, but in the United States and in 
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the Vatican, and her feminist activism picked up quickly following the trial.  Ms. magazine, a 
leading feminist publication, named her one of its “women of the year” in January 1987.58  In 
February 1988, she wrote an article for the National Catholic Reporter called “Catholic 
Women on a Collision Course with the Vatican,” the “inside stories” of “13 valiant women 
challenging the church.”59  She consistently criticized the church for failing to give women 
decision-making authority and declared Catholic women “the most oppressed women of any 
denomination or church.”60  By locating the origin of these feminist views in her sanctuary 
work, Nicgorski connected both currents of her political engagement.  She saw the suffering 
and oppression of Central American women refugees and the disempowerment of American 
Catholic women as both stemming from patriarchal structures in American religion.  For 
Nicgorski, to critique only the bishops’ reluctance to endorse sanctuary or Church patriarchy 
was insufficient.  These two issue were intimately related, and Nicgorski believed they 
needed to be addressed together. 
Conclusion 
The sanctuary movement was thus in many ways a creative continuation of 
progressive and radical trends that had emerged decades earlier in the American Catholic 
Church. Continuing to explore the new political expressions of their faith made possible by 
Vatican II, Catholic sanctuary activists renewed and expanded the work of the Catholic Left.  
Protesting religious and political authority, sanctuary Catholics continued a tradition of 
antiwar protest that also drew together Catholic concerns about racial justice and immigration 
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and challenges to the absolute authority of the hierarchy.  Through this work, activists 
asserted the right of religious and laity to greater autonomy and a greater say in defining 
American Catholic social practice and self-understanding. 
But these actions had significantly less force than the deliberations and 
pronouncements of the American bishops themselves.  Paradoxically, the Second Vatican 
Council allowed for both a “democratization” of the Church and a consolidation of episcopal 
power and authority.  Arriving a mere fifteen years after the conclusion of the Council, the 
sanctuary movement was a test of the bishops’ solidarity and provoked the bishops to work 
out their own understanding of the proper scope and justifications of Catholic social 
engagement.  As a handful of bishops themselves came to support the sanctuary movement, 
these questions would produce often-stark divisions among the bishops, but by the end of the 
decade, they had used the occasion to develop more robust and nuanced understandings of 
how Catholics—bishops, priests, religious, and laity alike—could properly engage in social 
and political struggles on the basis of their faith. 
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III 
 
The Catholic Left Infiltrates the Hierarchy 
 
American Catholic Bishops and the Challenge of Sanctuary 
 
 
 
 When Sister Darlene Nicgorski read her sentencing statement to Judge Earl Carroll in 
June of 1986, she justified her participation in the sanctuary movement in part by referring to 
a statement by Milwaukee archbishop and sanctuary supporter Rembert Weakland.  In 
response to critics who asked whether sanctuary work was morally justified, he had replied, 
“Is the inactivity of those who stand by and do nothing while they see the lives of fellow 
human beings put into jeopardy morally justifiable?”1  Weakland’s response represented a 
remarkable development within the American Catholic church hierarchy.  As one of the most 
prominent episcopal backers of sanctuary within the hierarchy, Weakland represented an 
increasingly vocal left wing among American bishops.  By the 1980s, the Catholic Left had 
made its mark not only on the “grass roots” of the American Church but on some of its 
foremost leaders as well. 
 Prior to the 1960s, American Catholic bishops had generally avoided critical or 
radical positions with respect to federal policy, especially foreign policy. Protestants often 
suspected Catholics of being anti-American pawns of the Vatican.  In this environment, the 
bishops were at pains to demonstrate their patriotism and fidelity to the American nation, 
which they accomplished, with some exceptions, by expressing support for American wars 
and remaining silent with respect to many other issues of national significance.  Virtually all 
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bishops strongly discouraged any form of illegality or civil disobedience and focused most of 
their political activity on quiet advocacy for their congregations in local contexts.2  As was 
the case for other American Catholics, however, the hierarchy began to change the form and 
degree of its political engagement in the 1960s in response to Second Vatican Council and 
the Vietnam War.  Under the authority of Vatican II, the bishops established two national 
bodies in 1966—the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and the United States Catholic 
Conference—which challenged the bishops to figure out how and to what extent to act as a 
cohesive group. They first explored this project in the context of the Vietnam War, and they 
moved slowly from endorsement of the war in 1966 to opposition in 1971.3  But as a group 
they remained fairly cautious when commenting on and engaging in politics, and it was not 
until the late 1970s and 1980s that they began publicly taking strong, nuanced political 
positions that often cut across ideological boundaries.4 
 The sanctuary movement was part of the story of the political maturation of the 
bishops on the national stage, but it also posed special problems to the hierarchy.  Both 
individually and as a group, bishops expressed opinions that sometimes corresponded to 
“liberal” positions and sometimes to “conservative” positions, but episcopal support for 
sanctuary was remarkable in that it gave official church backing to what many considered a 
form of civil disobedience.  The few bishops who supported the movement had to find ways 
to reconcile their faith with their endorsement of possibly illegal activity, which in turn 
prompted sanctuary skeptics and critics within the hierarchy to articulate more sophisticated 
explanations of why they found sanctuary activism incompatible with Catholicism.  Yet 
bishops who rejected sanctuary also had to square this position with the hierarchy’s 
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unanimous criticism of Reagan’s Central America policy, and attempts to do so forced them 
to take more favorable positions with respect to sanctuary than might otherwise have been 
expected.  Because pro-sanctuary bishops worked within a nationally organized hierarchy 
newly willing to dissent from government policy in significant ways, they were able to push 
the hierarchy to adopt more nuanced and left-leaning positions than would have been 
possible otherwise. 
 Sanctuary was not the first public issue with which the American hierarchy grappled 
as a group, nor was it the only one with respect to which they began to formulate nuanced 
positions during the 1980s.  But as an issue that pertained directly to Catholic life and to 
questions of the relationship between religious and political obligations, it was one of the 
most important factors driving bishops to elaborate richer accounts of the relationship 
between Catholicism and American politics.  As the movement faded at the end of the 
decade, the bishops emerged with more sophisticated understandings of appropriate forms of 
Catholic social and political engagement and with greater confidence in their capacity for 
bold and independent action in the political sphere. 
The Bishops Find Their Voice 
 In May of 1986, the National Catholic Reporter ran an article in which two 
prominent Catholics who had faced trial in Tucson over the past year, Sister Darlene 
Nicgorski and Father Tony Clark, excoriated the United States Catholic Conference (USCC) 
for a legal memo that concluded the sanctuary movement was illegal.  Nicgorski criticized 
the conference for taking “the legal opinion of corporate lawyers instead of following the 
Spirit,” and Clark went even further, calling the bishops “‘a bunch of cowards’ for their 
failure to address [the] moral dimensions” of the refugee crisis and the movement.  But 
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Monsignor Daniel Hoye, the general secretary of the USCC, pointed out that the bishops 
were divided over how to respond to the sanctuary movement, and he was right to point out 
that the strident criticisms expressed by Nicgorski, Clark, and others failed to recognize the 
complex and uneven relationship between the bishops and Catholic sanctuary activists.5  
Rather than a definitive judgment, the 1986 memo appeared to be something of a 
compromise, a document that expressed a sort of middle ground within the spectrum of 
bishops’ positions on sanctuary but avoided making a strong statement on the sanctuary 
movement one way or another.  Individual bishops took a variety of stances on the 
movement, and there was little agreement either between groups of bishops or between the 
hierarchy and sanctuary activists. 
 All of these groups, however, agreed in at least one way: they condemned the Reagan 
administration’s intervention in the Central American civil wars as unjustified violent 
interference in the affairs of foreign countries.  As early as 1981, the bishops criticized the 
Reagan administration’s policy in El Salvador and Nicaragua, in one 1981 statement calling 
for an “end to all United States military assistance to El Salvador and urg[ing] the Reagan 
Administration to maintain economic aid to Nicaragua.”6  They remained firm critics of the 
administration’s policy throughout the decade, releasing a statement in 1987 that called US 
support for the contras “morally wrong” and calling for peace in the country.7  This 
willingness to criticize US foreign policy was in many ways departure for the American 
hierarchy, which had usually supported US wars through the 1960s and even then only 
slowly came around to condemning the war as a group.  The nation’s first bishop, John 
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Carroll of Baltimore, set a precedent by vocally upholding the mutual compatibility of 
Catholicism and Americanism and standing behind Washington’s foreign policy in his 
support for the War of 1812.8  Subsequent bishops, though lacking the unity of a national 
body until the 20th century, continued to work in the same vein Carroll had opened up.  They 
strove to demonstrate their loyalty and patriotism as American citizens, toeing the 
governmental line again and again on matters of war.  Confederate and Union Catholics 
preached fervent support for their respective sides in the American Civil War, and their war 
fever continued well into the 20th century.  As Timothy Byrnes notes, the “only war to which 
the bishops had to react in the years 1865 to 1917 was the Spanish-American War of 1898, 
and…[while m]any bishops were skeptical of American aims before the war began…they 
became wholly supportive once the shooting actually started.”  As Byrnes’ comment 
suggests, Catholic bishops’ support for American wars was not perfectly unflagging or 
unanimous.  Many bishops rejected the war mania leading up to conflicts like the Spanish-
American War, for instance, and individual bishops sometimes took highly critical positions 
on matters of government policy.9 But as a group, the bishops would continue their strong 
support for US wars.  They released statements during the world wars supporting the US and 
promising that Catholics would serve the country loyally, and during World War II major 
Catholic leaders often campaigned for the war cause.10 
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 By the time Americans began protesting the Vietnam War, of course, much had 
changed, both in the Catholic Church and in America.  Most important for the bishops, the 
Second Vatican Council had led to the American hierarchy to organize themselves on the 
national level.  One of the documents produced by the Council, the Dogmatic Constitution on 
the Church, emphasized the “collegiality” of the bishops, the notion that church authority 
derives from the bishops as a whole and not from the Pope delegating authority to other 
bishops.  Following this emphasis, a separate document, the Decree on the Bishops’ Pastoral 
Office in the Church, called for the establishment of regional or national conferences in 
which bishops could discuss theology and Catholic life in a single forum.  The American 
bishops responded to this call by establishing two national bodies in 1966—the National 
Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) and the United States Catholic Conference (USCC), 
which would handle administrative issues like legal matters, public relations, and lobbying 
for the bishops’ conference.11  These structures armed the bishops with sufficient 
organization to articulate unified views on national issues and thereby raised the possibility 
of dissenting from federal policy. 
 This possibility was strengthened by the shifting demographics of the US Catholic 
after World War II.  American Catholics had previously been mostly urban, working-class 
populations with little education, but in the 1950s and 1960s they began moving into the 
suburbs, receiving better education, and seeking higher-paying jobs.  They began to look and 
feel less alien to themselves and to American Protestants, and consequently their burden to 
prove their “Americanness” grew less.12  Under these circumstances, the bishops could divert 
their resources from defending the Americanness of Catholic below them to identifying and 
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defending other church interests, a task enabled by their newfound national organization.  
They now had the strength and freedom to dissent when they so chose.  Commenting on the 
Vietnam War was something of a test run of this newfound freedom, and the hierarchy 
remained fairly cautious.  Aside from a few individual voices, bishops were slow to join 
ranks with those opposing the war; they only did so in 1971 with their Resolution on 
Southeast Asia.  The antiwar stance was no longer radical by then, but this gesture was a 
turning point nonetheless: for the first time the American bishops had openly criticized a US 
war.13  Having found their footing in the 1970s, the hierarchy could now sustain a strong 
critique of Reagan’s Central America policy. 
Even given these organizational and demographic changes, the American hierarchy’s 
challenge to the Reagan administration’s policy remains surprising in light of the history of 
Catholic anti-Communism in the 20th century.  Since at least the 1930s, American Catholics 
mounted large-scale criticism of and opposition to Communism.  Though this position 
derived in part from ultramontane anti-modernism, Catholics feared Communism for a much 
more concrete reason as well: the Soviet Union had institutionalized the anti-religious claims 
of Marxist theory, which identified religion as the “opiate of the people” and an obstacle to 
true class consciousness.  The Soviet regime had actively sought to eliminate religion from 
Russian life, imprisoning priests, closing churches, and confiscating church property.14  
Because of the direct threat Communism posed to world Catholicism and American 
Catholicism in particular, the American hierarchy and Catholics at all levels of the Church 
vehemently attacked this left-wing ideology and its instantiation in the Soviet Union.  Such 
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criticism increased after Pope Pius XI released an encyclical in March 1937 condemning all 
cooperation with Communism, and it grew further during World War II.15  On the eve of the 
United States’ wartime alliance with the Soviet Union, the American hierarchy took its 
super-patriotism to new heights by joining the US “anti-Communist consensus” early and 
echoed Pius XI in a 1941 pastoral letter by declaring that “there can be no compromise with 
Communism.” Cardinal Francis Spellman of New York vigorously defended US foreign 
policy and traveled the world as Catholic military vicar of the United States, preaching anti-
Communism to armed service members of all confessions.  The hierarchy’s firm 
commitment to this anti-Communist stance stemmed from their history of strong support for 
US wars and, as usual, the Communist threat to religion more generally, but this stance 
carried with it some liabilities.16  Stridently anti-Communist Catholics in the 1930s and early 
1940s risked coming off as fascist sympathizers, and anti-Communist, anti-Soviet stances 
were politically anomalous once the United States entered into an alliance with the Soviet 
Union against their common fascist enemies in the early 1940s.17  But Catholics evidently 
perceived the Communist threat as more serious than these political risks, and the hierarchy 
stuck to this hardcore anti-Communism for decades. 
 If the bishops’ critique of the Vietnam War represented a tentative pulling away from 
hardcore Catholic anti-Communism, their opposition to Reagan’s Central America policy 
demonstrated a willingness to break from it completely when they found it necessary to do 
so.  The Reagan administration framed its intervention in the Central American civil wars as 
a crucial battle in the fight to topple Communism and the Soviet Union, and in earlier 
decades, the American hierarchy may have reproduced this rhetoric and supported the policy.  
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But, like the sanctuary activists, they opposed Reagan’s support for the contras and the 
Guatemalan and Salvadoran governments from the beginning.  Moreover, the bishops also 
shared with the sanctuary movement an interest in alleviating the plight of Central American 
refugees.  Given the frequency with which refugees and Salvadoran rebels were 
characterized as left-wing terrorists or radicals seeking a new base in the Untied States, the 
bishops’ decision to view them as innocent victims of a conflict who required assistance also 
flew in the face of the hierarchy’s traditional anti-Communist role.18  Many bishops favored 
granting “extended voluntary departure” to Salvadoran refugees in the United States, which 
would have withheld an official refugee status from the Salvadorans but allowed them to 
temporarily remain in the US with impunity.19  In 1985, for instance, on the heels of the 
indictments of the Tucson sanctuary workers, three US bishops—Manuel D. Moreno of 
Tucson, Thomas J. O’Brien of Phoenix, and Jerome J. Hastrich of Gallup, New Mexico—
wrote a letter urging President Reagan to adopt just this policy.  They considered extended 
voluntary departure “the most immediate and constructive response [the] Administration 
could make to the plight of the refugees.”20 
 What might have motivated the American bishops to execute this about-face on their 
stance on Communism?  In the Central American case, this change of heart likely sprang 
from the fact that most of the “Communists” vilified by the administration were actually 
church officials, and in some cases priests and bishops.  Many Catholic leaders in Central 
America had led criticisms of economic inequality, government corruption, and repression in 
the region, and when the civil wars erupted, they suffered for having taken those positions.  
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Christian Smith notes that as more and more Latin American governments became 
militaristic and authoritarian, over a thousand bishops, priests, and religious were 
“threatened, arrested, kidnapped, tortured, killed, raped, and exiled” in Central and South 
America.21  Darlene Nicgorski observed the targeting and murder by the Guatemalan regime 
of Father Tulio Marruzzo, her pastor while she was on mission in that country.22  By far the 
majority of Salvadoran refugees were themselves Catholics.23  The American hierarchy 
realized that Catholics were among the principal victims of the Central American civil wars, 
and the bishops’ desire to advocate an end to the Reagan policy and assistance to the refugees 
evidently overrode their anti-Communist instincts.  This particular stance did not mean, of 
course, that American Catholics ceased their criticism of communism.  Rather, they realized 
that in the Central American case their interests lay in distinguishing real Communists from 
accused ones and criticizing the official government position on this basis. 
Enter the Catholic Left 
 Bishops Moreno, O’Brien, and Hastrich argued in their letter to Ronald Reagan that 
extended voluntary departure would be “the most immediate and constructive response [the] 
Administration could make to the plight of the refugees,” and this comment indicates that 
where the bishops began to disagree with the sanctuary movement—and with each other—
was over the question of the best way to help the refugees and criticize federal policy.  The 
unifying belief of the sanctuary movement, of course, was that the practice of sanctuary 
would best serve the dual purpose of aiding as many refugees as possible when the federal 
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government failed to do so and visibly criticizing Washington’s policy in Central America.  
But sanctuary presented a conundrum to the hierarchy.  Unlike most other mainline church 
bodies, the American bishops never endorsed sanctuary.  They were divided over whether or 
how to support the movement, and these divisions prevented the bishops from making any 
strong statements on the movement throughout the decade.  The NCCB and USCC 
articulated few official positions on the issue, and those they did release were cautious and 
ambiguous.  María Cristina García suggests that many interpreted the bishops’ reticence as 
“tacit approval of the movement,” while critics such as Darlene Nicgorski and Tony Clark 
saw the 1986 USCC statement on the illegality of sanctuary as cowardly.24  This spectrum of 
reactions indicates the bishops’ inconsistency and inability to commit to a strong stance.  
Given the lack of national unity, de facto authority to comment on the sanctuary 
movement fell more heavily on most individual bishops, who assumed a spectrum of 
positions from total rejection of the sanctuary movement to full support.  Least surprising 
were those who rejected sanctuary altogether.  Archbishop John Roach was a prominent and 
early critic, but Auxiliary Bishop Anthony Bevilacqua of Brooklyn tersely summed up the 
opinion of many bishops in a 1983 interview with the New York Times: “I am opposed to 
sanctuary because it is illegal,” he said.  “I do not feel at the present time that this [i.e., INS’s 
policy with respect to Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees] is an unjust law.”  Bevilacqua 
was not insensitive to the plight of the refugees in the United States; like many other bishops, 
he strongly favored granting them extended voluntary departure.  But he opposed sanctuary 
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simply because he believed it to be illegal.25  Those bishops who rejected sanctuary as illegal 
activity stood as the most recent instance of a long tradition of hostility to civil disobedience 
on the part of the American hierarchy.  During the middle of the 19th century, responding to a 
situation not unlike the Central American refugee crisis and the sanctuary response, 
American bishops refused to endorse abolitionism and stood with their church’s 
contemporary approval of the institution of slavery.  Speaking for many Catholics, Bishop 
Francis Patrick Kenrick of Philadelphia urged that “nothing should be attempted against the 
law.”  The bishops became antislavery after the war, of course, and unsurprisingly—publicly, 
they were concerned not with grappling with the moral dimensions of the issue but with 
appear as American as possible.26  In this and many other cases, that concern manifested as a 
powerful aversion to breaking the law, even as a form of civil disobedience, and that aversion 
was difficult to shake even in the very different political and social environment of the 1980s.  
To endorse sanctuary meant to endorse illegality, and for many bishops this was a step too 
far. 
In this context, then, it was remarkable that a small but significant minority of bishops 
endorsed the movement without qualifications.  The movement’s enjoyed early support from 
two bishops in particular, Milwaukee’s Archbishop Rembert Weakland and Archbishop 
Raymond Hunthausen of Seattle.  Weakland was the first to extend his support, declaring in 
1982 that he would support the establishment of sanctuary by any church in his diocese.27 
This declaration was a bold move into unknown waters—the sanctuary movement was only 
months old at this point—but it was consequential: five Milwaukee churches took him up on 
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his offer and voted to become sanctuaries at the end of 1982, most notably St. John’s 
Cathedral, which took on a refugee family in October.28  Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen 
became the second episcopal endorser of sanctuary in February of 1983, writing a letter to 
the Catholics of Western Washington state that urged them to help Central American 
refugees through all available means, including sanctuary.29 
Bishop John Fitzpatrick of Brownsville, TX, soon followed suit and showed that 
bishops could support sanctuary not only with their words but also their deeds.  In March of 
1983, Fitzpatrick established Casa Oscar Romero in Benito, TX, as a shelter for Central 
American refugees.  The shelter never declared itself a public sanctuary, but sanctuary 
supporters and critics alike came to focus on it as central to the story of the movement.  In 
February 1985, Jack Elder, director of Casa Oscar Romero, and Stacey Lynn Merkt, a 
volunteer there, were both convicted on charges of smuggling and transporting refugees 
across the border into the United States.  Elder and Merkt were both sanctuary workers, and 
they both received Fitzpatrick’s unswerving support.30  He criticized their arrest in late 1984, 
testified at their trial, and at one point even paid out $27,000 of his personal funds to help pay 
for Merkt and Elder’s bail bonds.31  Fitzpatrick also became something of a lightning rod for 
the sanctuary movement, symbolizing for its critics a “liberal” strain of church officials who 
abused their authority for political ends.  During Elder and Merkt’s pre-trial hearings, anti-
sanctuary protestors picketed outside their courthouse, and Concerned Citizens for Church 
and Country, a small lay Catholic group in Brownsville, hurled criticism at Fitzpatrick.  Mike 
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Rodriguez, the group’s president, labeled the archbishop a “coyote”—someone who does 
border runs to help immigrants into the country illegally—and helped organize an ad 
campaign in local newspapers calling for the Vatican to investigate Fitzpatrick and the 
diocese.  Fitzpatrick remained undaunted, responding, “I’d be delighted if representatives 
from Rome came here and investigated our work.”32 
While Mike Rodriguez and like-minded Catholics might have feared that liberal 
fanatics had hijacked the church to boost sanctuary work, those who supported sanctuary 
outright never constituted more than a small fraction of the hundreds of members of the 
bishop’s conference.  But even this small base of episcopal support for such a controversial 
movement indicated an astonishing development within the hierarchy.  Though American 
bishops had sometimes taken progressive stances on social and political issues in the past, the 
emergence of sanctuary supporters among the bishops constituted yet another turning point 
for the American hierarchy, one characterized most accurately as the arrival of the Catholic 
Left among the bishops themselves.  The defining characteristic of the Catholic Left of the 
1960s was its willingness to challenge both governmental and episcopal authority when it felt 
that either had endorsed or enacted immoral policies.  Partisans of the Catholic Left favored 
nonviolent protest, including acts of civil disobedience, to express their dissenting views; 
they felt that breaking earthly laws and challenging earthly authority were justified when 
these conflicted with the “higher law” of their faith.  Implausible though it once may have 
seemed, by supporting sanctuary, bishops like Weakland and Hunthausen incorporated this 
legacy of the Catholic Left into a small slice of the hierarchy itself.  For the first time they 
endorsed what many construed as civil disobedience, and they did so quite consciously. 
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The Catholic Left’s influence on the hierarchy was most apparent in Hunthausen’s 
letter to his diocese, in which he exhorted Catholics not only to aid Central American 
refugees through legal means but also to “go the last step and offer refugees from Central 
America sanctuary from the law.”  “It is our obligation as Christians,” he added, “to offer 
these innocent people sanctuary.”33  This statement shows the influence of the Catholic Left 
in a variety of ways.  First, while sanctuary workers disagreed with each other about whether 
to understand their activism as illegal, Hunthausen immediately took the more radical stance 
of portraying sanctuary as civil disobedience.  The circumstances of the moment meant that 
Central American refugees more urgently needed protection from the law than they needed 
protection under it, and Hunthausen was not afraid to entreat Catholics to break the law in 
order to provide this protection.  Second, Hunthausen’s claim that Christian (and, 
specifically, Catholic) faith not only encouraged but also demanded such civil disobedience 
directly paralleled the motivations and convictions of the Catholic Left.  Because earthly law 
had come into conflict with divine law, Christians were obligated to adhere to the latter.  
Finally, despite its radical overtones, this claim also signified a de-politicization of sanctuary 
activity.  Like the Action Community of the 1960s and 1970s, Hunthausen understood his 
injunction to support sanctuary as stemming not from any political or ideological conviction 
but a faith commitment.  He implied that Christians would support any policy, group, or 
movement that accorded with the principles of their faith, liberal or conservative, radical or 
moderate.  That sanctuary support appeared to some observers to be a left-wing or radical 
position was not, in Hunthausen’s view, a salient issue. 
Though Hunthausen appears to have sincerely believed that his position on sanctuary 
was one of faith, not politics, his stance nonetheless appeared quite progressive or left-wing.  
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Since becoming the bishop of Brownsville in 1971, John Fitzpatrick had worked to obtain 
better pay and working conditions for poor farm workers in Southern Texas.34  Rembert 
Weakland also headed an NCCB panel that released a pastoral letter on the US economy, 
criticizing economic inequalities and calling for economic policy that alleviated the burdens 
of the poor.35  But the pro-sanctuary bishops also took “liberal” stances that were particularly 
radical among the US hierarchy, namely, challenging, albeit in limited ways, the papal and 
patriarchal dimensions of the church hierarchy.  Raymond Hunthausen and Rembert 
Weakland in particular stood out in this respect.  In 1983, Pope John Paul II instructed 
Archbishop James A. Hickey of Washington, D.C., to investigate criticisms of Hunthausen’s 
ministry.  Hunthausen, a critic of the nuclear arms buildup, had withheld part of his income 
tax in 1982 to protest military policy, and he had caused consternation among some in his 
archdiocese by allowing openly homosexual Catholics to hear Mass at St. James Cathedral in 
Seattle.36  He was also criticized for “liberal” views on the role of women in the Church. His 
support of the sanctuary movement led to a formal investigation by the Vatican, which then 
relieved Hunthausen of his pastoral responsibilities in five areas, including liturgy and 
worship, moral issues, and clergy formation.  The NCCB declared its support of the Vatican 
decision the next month.37 
But not every bishop agreed with the NCCB decision, least of all Rembert Weakland, 
who expressed his dissent from the Vatican decision in two columns in his archdiocese’s 
newspaper, the Catholic Herald of Milwaukee.  Though he did not mention Hunthausen by 
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name, the columns appeared shortly after the censure of the Seattle archbishop. Weakland’s 
office sent the columns to reporters asking for his comments on the matter.  The pursuit of a 
pure doctrine, wrote Weakland, must eschew “the fanaticism and small-mindedness that has 
characterized so many periods of the church in its history—tendencies that lead to much 
cruelty, suppression of theological creativity and lack of growth.”  While he rejected 
relativism or an openness to any new idea, he maintained that the church “must always face 
up to the challenges of the times and the new discoveries about the universe and the human 
person” and that church “doctrine never finds a full verbal expression as it grows in new 
insights and understanding.”38  Weakland’s choice not to name Hunthausen specifically made 
his criticism somewhat less pointed, but these columns nonetheless represented a significant 
challenge to the authority of Rome and the NCCB.  Through both explicit critiques of high-
level individuals and institutions and pastoral and liturgical practices that challenged Catholic 
doctrine and tradition, Hunthausen and Weakland proved themselves to be true radicals 
within the church.  They were willing to challenge any teaching, practice, or structure of 
authority if they thought by doing so they remained more faithful to their commitments as 
Catholics. 
The Radicals Make Waves, and Their Colleagues Respond 
Though they may have been the most prominent commentators on sanctuary within 
the Catholic Church, publicly pro-sanctuary or anti-sanctuary bishops both remained few in 
number.  Many remained silent on the issue or commented only when forced to, and a 
number of moderates hoped to withhold their support of the movement without vilifying 
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Catholics and others who participated in it.  But the task of these moderate bishops became 
more complicated given the pressures of both pro-sanctuary bishops and the bishops’ 
collective disapproval of the Reagan administration’s Central America policy.  On one hand, 
without caution, criticism of the sanctuary movement might come across as an endorsement 
of administration’s policy, which moderate bishops wished to avoid.  On the other hand, they 
wished to distinguish themselves from their more radical colleagues, for reasons that often 
included their own skepticism of civil disobedience.  These pressures pushed moderate 
bishops to express a more nuanced and sophisticated position on sanctuary.  While to some it 
may have appeared that these bishops had avoided taking a clear stance, in the end they 
successfully expressed a legitimate middle position between the opinions of pro- and anti-
sanctuary bishops. 
The foremost representative of this moderate position was Archbishop Roger M. 
Mahony of Los Angeles.  Elevated to the position in 1985, the charismatic archbishop may 
have appeared to some as quite similar to bishops like Hunthausen and Weakland.  He took 
many pro-labor positions and expressed what many considered “liberal” opinions on 
economic and immigration matters.  But he rejected the “liberal” designation, finding labels 
unhelpful in general.  Like Hunthausen, he claimed that his positions on social and political 
issues stemmed from being “faithful to Jesus Christ and the tradition of the church.”  But he 
differed from Hunthausen and other “liberal” prelates in his strictly orthodox opinions on 
abortion, priestly celibacy, and women priests.  On doctrinal matters, claimed one LA Times 
article, he was unquestionably “The Pope’s man.”39  For Mahony, rejecting political labels 
made more sense than it did for Hunthausen, as his views truly did not correspond well to 
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any secular political stance.  It might appear that his opinions simply contradicted each other, 
that he held progressive social views and conservative religious views that together lacked a 
coherent framework, but this bad faith assumption fails to recognize the unity of religious 
experience for Mahony.  Responding to and commenting on social problems necessarily 
placed him on a political map with respect to certain issues, but these responses emerged 
from an attempt to apply his faith to his experience in a way that was consistent with his 
understanding of church doctrine and authority.  In doing so, Mahony did have to attempt to 
balance and reconcile conflicting principles and commitments, but he did so in a remarkably 
skillful way. 
Nowhere did Mahony demonstrate this skill better than in his position on the 
sanctuary movement, a position he refined as he entered more fully into the public eye.  
Upon ascending to the head of the archdiocese, Mahony began to express his opinions on the 
sanctuary movement, which were at first generous but cautious.  He told the LA Times, 
“People who come to us seeking shelter, clothing, and food we will welcome and take care of 
regardless of their residency status.  The Gospel does not require us to ask for 
documentation.”  But he added that he had not designated any church or other archdiocesan 
body as a sanctuary, as he had “serious questions about the advisability of that” practice.40  In 
other words, Mahony approved of every method of helping Central American refugees but 
the public declaration of sanctuary.  He did not elaborate at this point on just why he found 
such declarations inadvisable, but his priority for the time being seemed to be helping Central 
Americans to the greatest extent possible while avoiding the political lightning rod that was 
sanctuary. 
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Mahony’s comments were evidently not sufficiently precise, as sanctuary supporters 
tended to interpret them as support for sanctuary.  In November 1985, as Los Angeles’ Old 
Plaza Church prepared to declare itself the city’s first Catholic sanctuary, sanctuary 
organizers announced that Mahony would be present for the declaration ceremony on 
December 12, at which they claimed he would celebrate Mass.41  But in early December, 
though it became clear that Mahony had given his approval to Father Luis Olivares, pastor of 
the Old Plaza Church, to make the declaration, an archdiocesan spokesman clarified that 
Mahony was “not taking a stand on approval or disapproval” of the move.  Mahony wanted 
“to distance himself from the sanctuary movement,” the spokesman said, “which is a red flag 
for some people.”42  Admittedly, much political manipulation seems to have been at work 
here, with Mahony trying to avoid a hot-button issue and sanctuary supporters twisting 
Mahony’s words to their own ends as far as they could.43  But this semantic tug-of-war was 
also an effort to work out with greater clarity the positions bishops might take on the 
sanctuary movement, and in the process Mahony’s position became complex.  It was an 
unusual move for a prelate with qualms about the “advisability” of sanctuary and who 
refused to endorse the movement himself to give a green light to a sanctuary declaration in 
his own diocese.  Mahony’s stance may have had the political aim of alienating as few 
people as possible, but it was also an evolving attempt to respond appropriately to a 
phenomenon of whose utility and, perhaps, legality he remained skeptical. 
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By 1986, after wrangling with activists over the meaning of his previous statements 
on the movement, Mahony seemed to have settled into a more defined stance with respect to 
sanctuary.  An LA Times article from February reported him as reiterating the belief that a 
“refugee’s home country or status should not be of consequence to aid-giving church 
authorities…adding that the sanctuary movement has confused the issue of ministry to 
immigrants by separating undocumented people into a special category.”44  The first part of 
his comment represented a subtle reproduction of sanctuary activists’ critique of INS’ 
refugee policy, namely, that INS precluded refugees of Salvadoran and Guatemalan origin 
from entering the asylum process almost categorically.  Standing with the sanctuary 
movement in this respect, he went on to criticize it on practical grounds, arguing that 
sanctuary work had “confused the issue of ministry”—in other words, that political 
considerations within the movement had produced a practice among Catholics out of step 
with the demands of their religion.  Like his concern that sanctuary was a “red flag” for 
some, this criticism finds found with sanctuary on practical grounds, in the sense that the 
practice of sanctuary may have threatened Catholics’ ability to fulfill religious duty to serve 
refugees by encouraging them to do so by illegal and thus illegitimate means.  Though 
Mahony’s remarks may appear calculated and politically motivated, they consistently 
affirmed his commitment to his faith-based obligations as he understood them.  He never 
raised questions of sanctuary’s legality and only questioned the practice when he believed its 
contentiousness limited its effectiveness or when he felt it caused Catholics to stray from 
their true Christian duty. 
Like Mahony, the bishops’ council as a whole was forced by pressures from its left 
wing to adopt a more nuanced position on the movement, and the response it settled on in 
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1987 statement that bore a surprising degree of resemblance to Mahony’s ultimate position.  
But one more event would have to take place before the bishops felt comfortable adopting a 
more specific position on sanctuary: a papal visit to the Untied States that gave the story of 
Catholics and the sanctuary movement a new twist.  In a speech to nearly 300,000 people 
given in San Antonio, TX, in September of 1987, Pope John Paul II praised the “great 
courage and generosity” of those “who have been doing much on behalf of suffering brothers 
and sisters arriving from the south.”  The Pope failed to identify sanctuary in particular or 
endorse civil disobedience, but a member of the papal entourage indicated to the LA Times 
that these remarks had the sanctuary movement as their intended object.  This anonymous 
official evidently convinced the Times of this interpretation, as the paper ran the story with an 
enormous bold headline that read, “Sanctuary Movement Encouraged By Pope.”45  Such an 
endorsement would have been enormously consequential in an environment in which the 
NCCB was the only mainline Christian group not to have endorsed the movement and in 
which several Catholics had been convicted in the Tucson trial just a year previously, and it 
would have hugely boosted the credibility of left-leaning bishops like Rembert Weakland and 
the chastened Raymond Hunthausen. 
But the tide turned again just as quickly.  The next day, the LA Times ran an article 
entitled, “Papal Aide Denies Speech Endorsed Sanctuary Group.”  Vatican aide Joaquin 
Navarro Valls had clarified the Pope’s remarks, explaining in an official statement that it was 
not an endorsement of sanctuary and that the pontiff had “addressed the phenomenon of 
undocumented immigration on the moral, not legal, level.”  “While expressing compassion 
for undocumented aliens and admiration for those who seek to aid them,” he added, “he did 
                                                
45 Don Schanche and J. Michael Kennedy, “Sanctuary Movement Encouraged By Pope,” The Los Angeles 
Times, September 14, 1987, B1, B8. 
89  
not endorse any specific movement or group nor did he encourage violation of the civil laws 
as a solution to this problem.”46  Had the LA Times and the member of the papal entourage 
simply been too optimistic when they interpreted the pope’s remarks as an endorsement of 
sanctuary, or did these conflicting interpretations reveal divisions over sanctuary within 
Vatican circles?  Did John Paul II intend at first to endorse the movement but, sensing 
undesirable political liability, backpedal rapidly?  The answers to these questions are not 
clear, but it is clear that the final interpretation given by the Pope aligned to a large extent 
with Mahony’s position: he promoted refugee aid while avoiding both commenting 
specifically on the movement and endorsing civil disobedience. 
Perhaps without meaning to, the Pope had with his remarks placed new constraints on 
and given new direction to the American hierarchy’s relationship to sanctuary, and the 
hierarchy could now act on the issue with greater confidence and clarity.  Two months after 
the papal visit, the bishops used their 1987 statement on Central America to ask parishes and 
other Catholic organizations to “increase their already commendable assistance to refugees in 
need, regardless of their standing before the law” but avoided backing the sanctuary 
movement in any way.47  As Mahony had, this statement appropriated sanctuary worker’s 
frustration with INS’s discrimination on the basis of home country but changed it from a 
criticism of the government into a mistake the bishops urged Catholics not to make.  As 
usual, this nuance was difficult to communicate effectively.  The headline for the National 
Sanctuary Newsletter’s reporting on this statement was “U.S. CATHOLIC BISHOPS 
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SPEAK OUT: Condemn the war and support the work of sanctuary.”48  The newsletter seems 
to have latched onto the part of the statement claiming, “We are conscious...of those who 
may not fulfill the requirements of the present legislation on legalization,” taking it as a 
covert endorsement of sanctuary much in the same way observers had interpreted the Pope’s 
remarks.  But by now it was clear that the bishops were not going to endorse the sanctuary 
movement and that, as much as sanctuary activists may have craved the unified approval of 
the American Catholic hierarchy, this statement was carefully crafted to avoid such approval.  
How the hierarchy reached this specific statement is unclear; as Monsignor Daniel Hoye told 
the National Catholic Reporter in 1985, sanctuary had divided the bishops, and it was 
unclear how they could agree on a response.  The Pope’s 1987 comments, implicitly and 
perhaps deliberately approving of Mahony’s stance as it developed through 1985 and 1986, 
appeared to provide the compromise position that would allow the American hierarchy to 
make a minimally committed statement on the movement—even if they could never bring 
themselves to name sanctuary specifically.  In the end, individual bishops remained the main 
episcopal authorities on the sanctuary movement, which they were never able to confront 
directly as a group. 
Conclusion 
Despite the NCCB’s eventual sidestepping of the sanctuary issue, the encounter 
between the American Catholic hierarchy and the sanctuary movement had a profound 
influence on the American bishops.  At the beginning of the decade, despite their experience 
criticizing the Vietnam War and their by now longstanding acceptance into the mainstream 
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of American religious life, the bishops were still politically green.  They had little experience 
commenting on American politics in a sophisticated way, and they were still working 
through the implications of organizing at the national level over a decade earlier.  But the 
necessity of responding to the sanctuary movement induced a political maturation in the 
bishops, forcing them to articulate their stands on political issues with greater sophistication.  
The viewpoint of the Catholic Left finally made its way to the hierarchy with bishops like 
Raymond Hunthausen and Rembert Weakland, and their existence forced sanctuary 
moderates to walk a fine line between condemning and supporting the movement.  By the 
end of the decade, the bishops emerged individually and collectively with a stronger political 
voice, more comfortable in the political realm and more confident in their ability to articulate 
strong but nuanced opinions on matters of national significance, even when doing so might 
bring them into conflict with the government.  The encounter with sanctuary was almost the 
end of an era for the hierarchy, the completion of its political adolescence.  Untethered from 
their previous inhibitions, American Catholic bishops were free to enter a new stage of 
political autonomy. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Legacy of the Sanctuary Movement: 
 
 From South Central ’92 to New Sanctuary 
 
 
 The NCCB’s 1987 statement on Central America was a turning point for Catholic 
involvement in the sanctuary movement.  Sanctuary work by Catholics and others did 
continue through the end of the decade and into the early 1990s, but the American Catholic 
hierarchy’s interest in the movement quickly fell off.  The bishops’ failure to take a firm 
stand on the movement signified that it was no longer a priority to them.  Though they 
continued to sue for peace in the Central American conflicts and to advocate for the rights of 
Latin American in the United States, including Central American refugees, sanctuary fell 
permanently outside their focus.  Catholics and other sanctuary activists continued the 
routine work of caring for refugee families and transporting refugees away from the border, 
but a number of factors indicated that sanctuary activism had reached its peak and might 
soon enter into decline.  Media coverage of the movement quickly declined, and few legal 
challenges to sanctuary arose at the end of the decade.  Finally, changing political 
circumstances in the United States and Central America would ultimately make the sanctuary 
movement obsolete, bringing it to an end in 1992. 
The final legal challenge to sanctuary workers took place in 1988 when a Catholic 
sanctuary worker stood trial alongside a Lutheran minister in the first sanctuary case since 
1986 and the last major confrontation between the Reagan administration and sanctuary 
activists.  Demetria Martinez was a New Mexico poet and journalist who had contributed 
work to the Albuquerque Journal and the National Catholic Reporter, and with the Rev. Glen 
Remer-Thamert, she faced charges of illegally transporting a Salvadoran family from Ciudad 
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Juarez, Mexico, to Albuquerque.  Remer-Thamert contended that his actions were legal on 
his understanding of a 1986 declaration by then-Governor of New Mexico Toney Anaya, 
which declared the entire state of New Mexico a sanctuary.  Martinez claimed simply to have 
accompanied Remer-Thamert to observe and write about his journey and that her actions 
were legal under the first amendment.  The jury found these defenses convincing and 
acquitted both.1 
The Albuquerque trial showed that the movement had achieved some concrete 
successes.  If the sanctuary workers had as one of their main goals to reduce the likelihood 
that Salvadorans and Guatemalans would be deported by INS, they appear to have 
succeeded.  Inspired by the religious activists, many municipal and state institutions adopted 
the practice of sanctuary in modified form, allowing INS to operate within their jurisdictions 
but refusing to commit any of their own resources to identifying or deporting refugees.  In 
addition to the New Mexico, many cities—a total of twelve by 1986—declared themselves 
sanctuaries, including Detroit, Seattle, San Francisco, and Madison, WI.2  The Los Angeles 
city council briefly declared the city a sanctuary but moderated its position in the face of 
heavy criticism, and Detroit joined the list of sanctuary cities in 1987.3  By 1985, students at 
eleven colleges and universities on the West Coast had also organized to provide assistance 
to Central American refugees.4  It is difficult to measure whether these secular sanctuary 
projects helped the refugees in a significant way, but the moral appeal of the practice of 
sanctuary clearly extended beyond American religious communities.  Even if the movement 
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suffered a legal defeat in the Tucson trial, activists appear to have been more successful on 
the PR front, prompting others to adopt the practice of sanctuary in ways that likely 
alleviated some of the suffering of the Central American refugees. 
Nearly ten years after it had begun, the sanctuary movement also scored one final 
success with a legal settlement that resulted in a change to INS policy.  In May 1985, over 70 
sanctuary groups and other organizations aiding Central American refugees filed suit against 
the government requesting an end to the prosecution of sanctuary activists and an adjustment 
of INS policy that would end the perceived political discrimination against Salvadorans and 
Guatemalans in the asylum application process.5  A judge later dismissed the activists’ claims 
that Washington should drop its charges against sanctuary work but allowed a redrafting of 
the suit that retained the focus on INS refugee policy.  On December 19, 1990, the Bush 
administration finally agreed to a settlement that stipulated better treatment for the refugees 
by INS.  Building on a measure that Bush signed into law the previous year granting 
Salvadoran refugees 18 months of “temporary protected status,” the settlement allowed the 
refugees to apply for asylum at the end of the period rather than face deportation, and it 
permitted those who had begun the asylum process to work legally in the United States.  It 
also provided for new hearings of all asylum cases heard since 1980 and new training in 
international rights issues for the asylum officers and immigration judges dealing with these 
cases, with trainers designated by the church and immigrant rights groups who brought the 
suit in the first place.  The agreement had the potential to improve the lives and prospects of 
the hundreds of thousands of Central American refugees residing in the United States.6  This 
decision was undoubtedly a major victory for the sanctuary movement, but the settlement 
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avoided truly putting INS policy to a legal test, and it arrived far later than sanctuary activists 
had hoped.  Central American refugees had already lived for up to a decade under previous 
INS policy; a policy change now could not undo deportations that had already taken place 
and abuses refugees still in the US had endured. 
As the 1990 settlement reveals, Bush’s election to the presidency changed the 
political landscape in ways that were favorable to the sanctuary movement and its ability to 
achieve its goals.  This shift stemmed in part simply from the end of Reagan’s presidency.  
The Reagan administration was both a primary target and antagonist of the sanctuary 
movement, and Bush’s accession to the presidency removed this obstacle to sanctuary.  
Moreover, the Reagan Justice Department had a special dislike of sanctuary and prosecuted 
sanctuary workers aggressively.  Bush’s more lenient policies toward refugees in 1989 and 
1990, however, demonstrate that the new president was somewhat more sympathetic to 
positions taken by sanctuary workers than was his predecessor, likely due in part to his more 
pragmatic, “realist” stance on issues touching on foreign policy.7 
Another important development that took place during Bush’s presidency, in part due 
to changes in US policy, was the resolution of some of the conflicts in Central America.8  
Peace first appeared possible in Nicaragua, when in 1989 the Bush administration shifted its 
focus from providing the contras military aid to helping them succeed in a presidential 
election scheduled for 1990.9  The opposition candidate, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, 
emerged victorious from the polls, allowing the contras to disband and the US to declare 
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peace and victory in the country.10  In El Salvador, conflict between the guerrillas and the 
government continued somewhat longer, but they reached an official peace agreement under 
the Bush administration as well.  After tense negotiations through the United Nations, both 
sides signed the agreement in January 1992, and a cease-fire went into effect in February.  
The agreement, however, was often difficult to enforce—though the FMLN disarmed in 
December, as promised in the agreement, the army failed at first to carry out a purge of top 
officials.11  The fall of the Soviet Union likely hastened these events by draining the Central 
American conflicts of the Cold War associations with which Reagan had imbued them. 
Despite these difficulties, the agreement satisfied sanctuary activists.  According to 
John Fife, the sanctuary movement officially came to an end in 1992 in response to news of 
the Salvadoran peace agreement.12  There are some indications that the movement was 
already in decline.  After Bush’s election in 1988, for instance, media coverage of the 
sanctuary movement fell off sharply.  By late 1990, the New York Times referred to the 
movement in the past tense.13  But after the movement’s official termination in 1992, some of 
its concrete accomplishments began to unravel, and in some cases public opinion began to 
turn against refugees.  In 1993 Suffolk County on Long Island repealed its ordinance offering 
the county as a sanctuary for refugees, and the following summer the County Legislature 
easily passed a resolution asking the state of New York for permission to deny health care 
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and welfare benefits to all non-citizen immigrants, undocumented refugees and legal 
immigrants included.14  The age of sanctuary had clearly come to an end. 
What, then, has been the legacy of the sanctuary movement?  One can only speak 
with circumspection and some speculation of the legacy of such recent events, but events of 
the last two decades indicate that the sanctuary movement has had complex and sometimes 
contradictory effects.  Suffolk County’s 1993 resolution hints at the difficulties 
undocumented Salvadorans and Guatemalans would continue to face after the 1980s, which 
began to manifest themselves as early as 1992.  When in late April of 1992 a Los Angeles 
jury acquitted four police officers charged with assaulting African-American city resident 
Rodney King, the city erupted into an enormous riot.15  Over 90% of those who participated 
in what The Nation’s Mike Davis referred to as the United States’ “first multiracial riot” were 
black and Hispanic, and Mexican- and Salvadoran-Americans largely constituted this latter 
group.  Roughly one tenth of Salvadorans worldwide, Davis noted, lived in and around LA, 
and he alluded to the reason for this huge population’s presence in the city in the first place: 
the influx of refugees fleeing the Salvadoran conflict throughout the 1980s.  The 
undocumented status of these refugees and their families proved to be a huge liability to 
those who participated in the riots.  By the time Davis wrote his article in June of 1992, the 
police had developed tactics for arresting and detaining suspected rioters, and undocumented 
individuals faced a special fate.  Back in 1986, the city council voted not to commit city 
resources to deporting immigrants.  According to Davis, this policy did not hold during the 
riots.  “Violating city policy,” he wrote, “the police fed hundreds of hapless undocumented 
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saqueadores [i.e., looters] to the I.N.S. for deportation before the A.C.L.U. or immigrant 
rights groups even realized they had been arrested.”16  The collaboration of the LAPD and 
INS in this respect bore a strong resemblance to INS’s policy with regard to Salvadoran 
refugees during the Reagan years.  Even the promised changes to INS policy in 1990 seemed 
ineffective: conditions for Salvadoran refugees during the LA riots remained little different 
from what they had been in the previous decade. 
Nonetheless, sanctuary activism had great significance for American Catholics.  
Catholic sanctuary work in the 1980s marked the high point of the Catholic Left in American 
history.  More Catholics than ever felt a willingness to dissent from both church and state 
when they believed that doing so was the only way to live up to their religious and civic 
commitments.  From bishops to laity, Catholics at all levels of the church declared parishes, 
congregations, and other bodies public sanctuaries and cared for Guatemalan and Salvadoran 
refugees, often risking arrest and trial in the process.  As the movement peaked in the late 
1980s, nearly 80 Catholic communities—a greater number than any other religious group 
represented in sanctuary—identified as public sanctuaries, out of a total of 464.17  Since 
Roman Catholicism was the largest single Christian denomination in the United States, it is 
hard to say whether this measure of Catholic participation in sanctuary work was 
disproportionate or not.  Still, the sheer number of Catholics involved actively in sanctuary 
work, as well countless others who supported the movement in quieter, less formal ways, was 
unprecedented.  The percolation of the Catholic Left mindset deeper into American Catholic 
communities showed up in other endeavors as well, most notably other branches of the 
                                                
16 Mike Davis, “In L.A., Burning All Illusions,” The Nation, Vol. 254, No. 21, June 1, 1992, 743. 
17 Chart listing denominational and geographical breakdown of sanctuaries in August 1988; Wisconsin 
Historical Society, Records of the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America 1982-1992, M93-153, 
Box 4, Folder 66. 
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Central America Peace Movement and the efforts of the Berrigan brothers in the anti-nuclear 
weapons movement.18  
But after the sanctuary movement came to an end in the early 1990s, few if any 
projects by radical Catholics approached the scale and significance that sanctuary had in the 
1980s.  Through in the 1990s the hierarchy maintained roughly the same political positions it 
had adopted by the end of the 1980s, but as progressive prelates and sanctuary supporters like 
Rembert Weakland and Raymond Hunthausen aged and their dissenting voices declined in 
significance, the hierarchy as a whole seems to have remained moderate or tacked to the 
right.  The current president of the US Council of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), Cardinal 
Timothy Dolan, offers a good example of this trend.19  When Rembert Weakland retired from 
his episcopal seat in Milwaukee in 2002, the Vatican replaced him with the theologically and 
politically conservative Dolan, who moved to head the Archdiocese of New York in 2009 
and was elevated first to the USCCB presidency in late 2010 and to cardinal as well in early 
2012.20  Though he has “declined to ferret out liberals in his midst,” Dolan’s assumption of 
the Milwaukee episcopacy and the USCCB presidency suggest a desire on the Vatican’s part 
in the decades following the 1980s to control the “damage” so-called liberals like Weakland 
and Hunthausen could create. 
But the bishops’ council under Dolan has retained the political lessons it learned in 
the 1980s as it grappled with the political valence of issues like sexuality and immigration.  
                                                
18 On the Berrigan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement, the Plowshares Movement, see Fred A. Wilcox, 
Uncommon Martyrs: The Berrigans, the Catholic Left, and the Plowshares Movement, Reading, Massachusetts: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company 1991. 
19 In 2001, the bishops merged the NCCB and USCC into a single body, the USCCB. “About USCCB,” 
http://usccb.org/about/index.cfm, accessed March 1, 2012. 
20 Michael Powell, “A Genial Conservative For New York’s Archdiocese,” The New York Times, February 24, 
2009, A9.  Laurie Goodstein, “Dolan Chosen as President of U.S. Bishops’ Group,” The New York Times, 
November 17, 2010, A1.  Sharon Otterman, “New York’s Next Cardinal,” The New York Times, January 8, 
2012, MB1. 
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When the Obama administration, for instance, mandated that all employers, including 
religious institutions like Catholic hospitals and schools, cover contraceptives under their 
employee health insurance plans, Dolan, like many other Catholic leaders and organizations, 
spoke out against the decision.  In his capacity as USCCB president, he directly confronted 
the administration’s decision in a statement in January of 2012, rejecting it and arguing that it 
violated Catholics’ right to freedom of religion.  “Never before has the federal government 
forced individuals and organizations to go out into the marketplace and buy a product that 
violates their conscience,” he said.  “Let your elected leaders know that you want religious 
liberty and rights of conscience restored and that you want the administration’s contraceptive 
mandate rescinded.”21  It was a bold and direct challenge to government policy, and it 
worked.  In February, the Obama administration offered a compromise plan in which 
employees of these institutions would still find their contraception covered, but directly 
through insurers rather than employers.  Given their hard-line stance on contraception, the 
bishops still rejected the plan, but they considered the compromise plan a step in the right 
direction.22  This confrontation would have been unimaginable prior to the 1980s and even 
during the sanctuary era.  Not only were the bishops confident enough to directly challenge 
government policy, but the president also felt compelled to change that policy in response.  
Over the past century, the American hierarchy has gone from defending an embattled 
minority and defending the Americanness of Catholics to boldly influencing US federal 
policy. 
                                                
21 “Cardinal-Designate Dolan Speaks Out Against HHS Rule, Calls For Action In New Web Video,” USCCB 
Website, News Releases, January 20, 2012, http://www.usccb.org/news/2012/12-013.cfm, accessed March 3, 
2012. 
22 Laurie Goodstein, “Catholic Bishops Reject New Plan on Contraception,” The New York Times, February 11, 
2012, A18. 
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Does the Catholic Left have a future in the United States?  Will coming decades see a 
continued use of the practice of sanctuary as a form of religious and political dissent and 
protest?  Recent years suggest an affirmative answer to both questions.  In mid-December 
1986, Dolores Mission Church, a small Catholic parish in East Los Angeles, expanded its 
official responsibilities as a sanctuary, offering refuge and assistance not only to Central 
American refugees but also undocumented Mexican immigrants who might not qualify for 
protection or citizenship under new immigration legislation passed earlier that year.23  
Dolores Mission was just one church, and a tiny one at that, but its more inclusive 
redefinition of sanctuary foreshadowed a development that would take place two decades 
later.  Beginning in 2006, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the successor of 
INS, began increasing the number of deportations it carried out, and conservative 
Republicans in Congress began leading a push for harsher immigration laws.  By mid-2007, a 
new national movement organized by religious leaders of a variety of faiths had begun to 
take shape in response to these developments.  Looking back to the sanctuary work of the 
1980s, the leaders of this movement referred to their efforts as the “New Sanctuary 
Movement” as they attempted to protect Latin American and other immigrants from 
detention and deportation.  They found the recent increase in detentions and deportations 
disturbing, and as members of Congress debated immigration reform, New Sanctuary 
activists sought to protect as many vulnerable immigrants as they could.24  A 2009 “national 
vision statement” summarized the movement’s goals: 
We are based in congregations around the country which are connected to immigrant families and 
communities who are facing the possibility of separation through deportation. We are together because 
                                                
23 “Parish to Provide Sanctuary to Those Denied Amnesty,” The Los Angeles Times, December 15, 1986, 
SD_A5. 
24 James Barron, “Churches to Offer Sanctuary,” The New York Times, May 9, 2007, B1, B7. 
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we are engaged in an authentic and passionate faith-rooted response to that suffering. We respond as a 
hospitable and welcoming community to those immigrant families and communities, and we respond 
prophetically to the unjust system that cause their suffering (including unfair trade policies). We are 
committed to amplifying the voices of these families so that they can be heard by those whose 
decisions affect their lives. We seek to encourage immigrant families, transform and deepen the 
commitment of congregations (particularly those congregations that would not typically advocate for 
immigrant rights) and promote the vision of a society characterized by a culture of hospitality. In all 
this, we draw from the wells of an ongoing movement of people of faith committed to justice.25 
Though New Sanctuary largely lacks organizational connections to its predecessor, the vision 
statement reveals philosophical continuities between the two.26  The New Sanctuary activists 
see themselves as working on an issue in which faith and politics intersect and see a 
fundamental concordance between their religious and political views, though religious 
motivations are primary.  Though New Sanctuary activists have nothing like the Reagan 
administration’s Central American intervention to criticize, the statement does connect the 
suffering of immigrants to one aspect of government policy, namely, what it identifies as 
“unfair trade policies.” 
 And as in the sanctuary movement of the 1980s, Catholics have played a prominent 
role in New Sanctuary.  In 2007, a Catholic church in New York City, St. Paul the Apostle, 
hosted a event in which several New York religious leaders of a variety of faiths declared 
their participation in the New Sanctuary Movement.27  And in 2011, the Most Holy Trinity 
                                                
25 “About Us,” New Sanctuary Movement temporary national website, 
http://www.sanctuarymovement.org/content/about-us, accessed March 2, 2012. 
26 Surviving members of the 1980s sanctuary movement often opted not to participate in New Sanctuary.  John 
Fife, for instance, instead co-founded No More Deaths, an interfaith organization whose volunteers went into 
the Sonoran Desert and helped prevent the deaths of individuals and families attempting to cross the border 
from Mexico to the United States.  Despite this focus, Fife has supported the New Sanctuary Movement.  Brady 
McCombs, “Church’s move to sanctuary hearkens to controversy years ago,” Arizona Daily Star, October 9, 
2011, http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/article_18452d35-1b9f-574d-99aa-e166c24b6893.html, accessed 
March 2, 2012. 
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Catholic Church nearly became the first sanctuary church of any kind in Tucson since the 
early 1990s (a court decision delayed the deportation of an immigrant family, obviating the 
need for sanctuary).  Rev. Bill Remmel, the pastor of Most Holy Trinity, told the Arizona 
Daily Star that, depending on the circumstances, he would absolutely consider sheltering 
other immigrants facing deportation.28  And if Remmel is any indication, Catholic 
involvement in the New Sanctuary Movement means that the Catholic Left may have a role 
to play in American religious and political life for some time to come.  Recent years have 
begun to suggest that both the practice of sanctuary and Catholics’ place in it are not just 
transient responses to the political moment but manifestations of deeper trends in American 
Catholic life.  Vatican II, the milieu of Vietnam-era America, and a number of other political, 
social, and cultural shifts that took place in the 20th century opened a new vein in the self-
understanding and religious practice of American Catholics.  They no longer felt that strict 
obedience to religious and political authority always superseded fidelity to the principles that 
grounded that authority, and they believed these two sources of authority to be fundamentally 
concordant with each other.  Their willingness to challenge these authorities signified not a 
desire to disrupt their religious and political communities but the desire to recover them from 
error, to push them to live up to their principles and ideals.  This philosophy has taken root in 
the minds of many American Catholics, and its legacy seems likely to unfold in their lives, as 
well as the lives of all Americans of all faiths and beliefs, for some time to come. 
 
                                                
28 Brady McCombs, “Church’s move to sanctuary hearkens to controversy years ago,” Arizona Daily Star, 
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